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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every year, hundreds of thousands of children are exposed 
to harmful pesticides, resulting in acute injury and even death, 
and contributing to longer-term chronic diseases and 
disabilities, which can include neurological disorders, 
reproductive problems, developmental delays, and cancer.1  
Until recently, however, the United States had nothing in its 
pesticide laws that addressed issues specific to children’s 
health, and very little data was available regarding the unique 
impacts of pesticides on children.  In 1996, Congress passed the 
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA),2 which directs the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to apply a 
presumptive, additional tenfold margin of safety in setting 
pesticide residue tolerances on food to take into account toxicity 
and exposure of pesticides to infants and children.  This law, 
arguably the first environmental law to require that issues 
specific to children’s health be considered in setting 
environmental risk standards, resulted in a flurry of scholarly 
writing, ranging from hope to skepticism, as the scientific and 
regulatory aspects of the law were debated.3 
                                                          
 1. JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN’S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW SCIENCE AND 
LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES 178 (1996) (stating that 
“[b]etween 1 and 3 million people, many of them children, are poisoned by 
pesticides in the world each year, and at least 168 different pesticide 
compounds are known to have caused significant human illness or death”); 
Bruce P. Lanphear, Charles V. Vorhees & David C. Bellinger, Protecting 
Children from Environmental Toxins: Toxicity Testing of Pesticides and 
Industrial Chemicals Is a Crucial Step, 2 PLOS MEDICINE 203, 203-04 (2005), 
available at http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/1549-
1676/2/3/pdf/10.1371_journal.pmed.0020061-L.pdf. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996). 
 3. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Consequences of Consensus: Dangerous 
Compromises of the Food Quality Protection Act, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1155 (1997) 
(arguing that FQPA continues overregulation of pesticide residues on food); 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide 
Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 431 (2003) (analyzing the administrative state’s failure to 
protect farmworkers from pesticides and how tort actions can catalyze 
improved field protections while compensating victims); Steven Geoffrey 
Gieseler, On a Viable and Effective Future for the Food Quality Protection Act, 
9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 345 (2004) (detailing history of FQPA and current 
scientific methodology under the law and providing suggestions to improve the 
law’s implementation); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, 
Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection 
Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103 (2001) (discussing science and policy issues 
necessary to implement the FQPA’s focus on risks to children and reasons why 
EPA has been unable to fulfill the law’s mandates); Linda-Jo Schierow, 
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Nearly ten years later, however, much of the law’s promise 
remains unfulfilled as EPA has often failed to set pesticide 
tolerances with margins of safety that are sufficiently 
protective of children and failed to require manufacturers to 
conduct adequate tests to determine specific impacts of 
pesticides on children.4  The purpose of this Article is to explore 
the extent to which state common law tort claims can act as a 
gap-filler to increase protection for children from harmful 
pesticides.  Unlike a state or federal agency, which can delay 
action on a legal or technical issue for years as a result of 
scarce resources, limited data, alternate priorities, or political 
pressure, judges must decide the cases before them based on 
the available evidence within a discrete (and relatively short) 
                                                          
Pesticide Residue Regulation: Analysis of Food Quality Protection Act 
Implementation, 10 RISK 281 (1999) (evaluating the status of FQPA 
implementation and concluding that EPA is making progress but contentious 
implementation issues remain unresolved); James Smart, All the Stars in the 
Heavens Were in the Right Places: The Passage of the Food Quality Protection 
Act of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 273 (1998) (detailing history of passage of 
FQPA); Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in 
Pesticide Regulation and the EPA’s Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection 
Act’s Safeguards for Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315 (1999) (arguing that EPA 
has failed to implement many of the FQPA’s protections for children); Scott 
Douglas Bauer, Note, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Replacing Old 
Impracticalities with New Uncertainties in Pesticide Regulation, 75 N.C. L. 
REV. 1369 (1997) (discussing uncertainties involved in assessing risk and 
benefits under FQPA); Andrew J. Miller, Note, The Food Quality Protection 
Act of 1996: Science and Law at a Crossroads, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
393 (1997) (describing difficult task for EPA in utilizing science to set new 
pesticide risk assessments); Jennifer C. Miner, Comment, Do Environmental 
Laws Adequately Protect Children’s Environmental Health?  A Review of 
Existing Laws, Potential Legislation and Policy Considerations, 78 OR. L. REV. 
1101 (1999) (evaluating children’s special environmental vulnerabilities and 
current and potential laws to address them); Michael Schon, Comment, 
Susceptible Children: Why the EPA’s New Risk Assessment Guidelines for 
Children Fail to Protect America’s Future, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 701 (2004) 
(arguing that EPA’s risk assessment guidelines do not sufficiently protect 
children). 
 4. See, e.g., DAVID WALLINGA, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, PUTTING 
CHILDREN FIRST: MAKING PESTICIDE LEVELS IN FOOD SAFER FOR INFANTS AND 
CHILDREN 61-62 (1998) (discussing EPA failure to require data on 
neurotoxicity risks in pesticide registration process despite availability of 
validated testing protocols); Watnick, supra note 3, at 1341-43 (stating how 
EPA has failed to review the riskiest pesticide tolerances under the FQPA by 
the statutory deadline, has not routinely or consistently applied the tenfold 
safety factor to protect children in setting pesticide tolerances, and has not 
required pesticide registrants to test for a broad range of toxic effects in adults 
or children); Schon, supra note 3, at 720-23 (arguing that EPA guidelines for 
assessing cancer risks to children from pesticides do not fulfill the child 
protection mandates in the FQPA). 
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period of time.  This Article concludes that the Supreme Court’s 
2005 decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,5 which 
significantly limits the scope of federal preemption of common 
law tort claims against pesticide manufacturers, creates a 
significant opportunity for such claims to play an increasing 
role in pesticide policy with regard to children’s health.  Such 
claims can do so by spurring the collection and effective use of 
scientific data in this area. 
In order to realize this opportunity, this Article proposes 
that courts apply a modified scientific evidence standard and 
then shift the burden of proof to pesticide manufacturer 
defendants in cases in which the plaintiff can establish that the 
defendant failed to conduct reasonably available testing to 
gather currently unavailable scientific evidence on the issue of 
causation.  This Article posits that such a modification of 
current evidentiary standards under the common law can be 
justified not only on the precautionary principle inherent in the 
FQPA itself, but on the power of common law courts to shape 
tort law to reflect the complexities of risk in today’s society. 
Section II of this Article presents a brief summary of 
federal pesticide law and the enactment of the FQPA.  Section 
III evaluates cases involving pesticides and children’s health in 
the context of claims against EPA and other regulatory 
agencies, as well as claims against pesticide manufacturers and 
sprayers.  Section IV explains why the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Bates makes lawsuits against manufacturers based 
on negligent testing and negligent design theories an 
increasingly powerful tool in spurring manufacturers to gather 
scientific data and provide additional protections for children.  
Moreover, this Section proposes that courts look to the 
precautionary principle embodied in the FQPA, and rely on 
their inherent powers to shape tort law, to modify the 
evidentiary burden for plaintiffs in pesticide cases where 
scientific uncertainty reasonably attributable to manufacturers 
would otherwise pose a virtually insurmountable barrier to 
relief. 
II. PESTICIDE REGULATION FROM FIFRA TO FQPA 
In 2000 and 2001, nearly five billion pounds of pesticides 
were used annually in the United States on homes, farms, 
                                                          
 5. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
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gardens and for industrial applications.6  Despite the 
widespread use of pesticides in nearly every sector of society, 
there is increasingly strong evidence that pesticides have had 
and continue to have adverse and pervasive effects on human 
health and the environment.  Rachel Carson’s 1962 book, Silent 
Spring,7 along with targeted lawsuits to ban the pesticide 
DDT,8 played a significant role9 in prompting Congress to 
overhaul the existing federal pesticide law through the 1972 
Amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
                                                          
 6. TIMOTHY KIELY, DAVID DONALDSON & ARTHUR GRUBE, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE:  2000 AND 2001 
MARKET ESTIMATES 10 (2004). 
 7. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 8. See Marshall Lee Miller, Pesticides, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 645, 647 (Gov’t Inst. 17th ed. 2003); see also Environmental Def. 
Fund v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dismissing action 
challenging EPA’s suspension of DDT use); Environmental Def. Fund v. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (remanding EPA decision not to 
suspend aldrin and dieldrin for consideration of additional scientific evidence); 
Environmental Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(requiring EPA Administrator to commence administrative proceedings to 
determine whether DDT registration should be canceled in the face of evidence 
concerning safety); Environmental Def. Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (holding environmental groups had standing to challenge Secretary 
of Agriculture’s failure to take prompt action on request for DDT suspension); 
Environmental Def. Fund v. United States Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 
428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding action on petitioners’ proposal to 
establish zero tolerance level for DDT residues on raw agricultural 
commodities did not have to await action by Department of Agriculture); 
THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 231-38 
(1981) (discussing lawsuits); WARGO, supra note 1, at 87-88 (same); Andrew P. 
Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, and Public Health: 
Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 
1, 24-25 (2002) (detailing lawsuits against the Department of Agriculture and 
EPA). 
 9. See CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE 
CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE 154-58 (1987) (recounting litigation and policy 
battles over DDT); DUNLAP, supra note 8, at 129-245 (same); Angus A. 
MacIntyre, Why Pesticides Received Extensive Use in America: A Political 
Economy of Agricultural Pest Management to 1970, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
533, 572-73 (1987) (detailing political, social, and legal activities leading up to 
the banning of DDT); Toward a Noisier Spring: D.C. Circuit Upholds 
Cancellation of DDT Registrations, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,013 
(1974) (detailing litigation and political fight leading up to decision by the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirming EPA’s cancellation of DDT).  By the late 
1960s, estimates were that one billion pounds of DDT were circulating 
throughout the world’s air and water; traces of DDT were found in birds and 
wildlife from Antarctica to the mid-Pacific Ocean, as well as in the body 
tissues and food supply of humans throughout the world.  3 WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES § 
5.1, at 12 (1988). 
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Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).10 
A. FIFRA AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
FIFRA’s primary provisions create and administer a 
federal, uniform system of registering pesticides.  A pesticide 
cannot be distributed, sold, or used until it is registered and 
approved by EPA.11  The EPA Administrator approves the 
registration based on its composition, labeling, and whether “it 
will perform its intended function without unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment.”12  FIFRA defines 
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as “any 
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into 
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and 
benefits of the use of any pesticide.”13 
Thus, EPA’s major policy function under FIFRA is to 
balance the pesticide’s risks to human health and the 
environment against the potential benefits flowing from its 
use.14  As a result, cost-benefit analysis is a central part of 
FIFRA’s regulatory framework.15  Although FIFRA provides for 
civil and criminal penalties for violation of the law’s 
requirements,16 it does not contain a private right of action.17  
                                                          
 10. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (2000)).  For judicial treatment of FIFRA’s evolution, see, for example, 
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601-02 (1991); and 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992 (1984). 
 11. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2000). For a more detailed description of 
federal pesticide regulation, see Alexandra B. Klass, Bees, Trees, Preemption 
and Nuisance: A New Path to Resolving Pesticide Land Use Disputes, 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2005). 
 12. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5). 
 13. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000). 
 14. See Miller, supra note 8, at 653. 
 15. See, e.g., Washington Toxics Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 
1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “FIFRA’s objective is to protect human 
health and prevent environmental harm from pesticides through a cost-benefit 
analysis of the pesticides”); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 
F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “FIFRA registration is a cost-
benefit analysis that no unreasonable risk exists to man or the environment” 
weighing the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the 
pesticide use (citing Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th 
Cir. 1984))); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 103 & n.16 (1999) 
(describing FIFRA as one of the only federal environmental statutes that 
provides for open-ended cost-benefit analysis as opposed to the vast majority of 
other environmental statutes that establish a “pro-environmental baseline”). 
 16. See 7 U.S.C. § 136l(a), (b) (2000). 
 17. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005) 
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This omission compromises optimal enforcement of federal 
pesticide law through private attorney general suits and limits 
the law’s ability to provide compensation for damages and deter 
improper pesticide registration and use. 
While FIFRA allows states to regulate the sale or use of 
any federally registered pesticide,18 it prohibits state 
involvement in pesticide labeling.  In a section entitled 
“Uniformity,” FIFRA provides that a state “shall not impose or 
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in 
addition to or different from those required under this 
subchapter.”19  The question of which state actions (whether 
actions by state agencies, jury verdicts, or judicial decisions) 
are (or should be) subject to federal preemption under this 
provision is significant in creating the boundaries within which 
litigants may use the courts to spur policy changes and data 
gathering through common law claims for damages arising 
from pesticides. 
B. THE FQPA AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The FQPA of 1996 represents the most recent iteration of 
Congress’s efforts to reconcile regulation of pesticides and 
control of pesticide residues on food.  In doing so, the FQPA 
also created one of the first environmental laws that 
specifically addressed the needs of children.  Before turning to 
the child-specific provisions of the law, the history leading up to 
the enactment of the FQPA helps place the law in its 
appropriate context. 
As detailed above, all pesticides are registered and 
regulated under FIFRA as administered by the EPA.  However, 
EPA regulates allowable levels of pesticide residues on food 
under a separate law—the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
                                                          
(noting that FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy for persons injured as a 
result of a manufacturer’s violation of FIFRA’s labeling requirements); No 
Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(discussing absence of private right of action in FIFRA). 
 18. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000). 
 19. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).  By contrast, states may impose additional 
requirements relating to the sale or use of pesticides.  See, e.g., National Bank 
of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
FIFRA strikes a balance between state and federal control and “leaves ample 
room” for state regulation (citing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 
U.S. 597, 613 (1991))); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 
1995) (holding that while FIFRA preempts a state’s imposition of additional 
labeling requirements, “it does not preempt a state’s authority to monitor 
compliance with labeling or other requirements imposed by FIFRA”). 
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Act (FFDCA).20  Under the FFDCA, EPA is responsible for 
setting the maximum allowable safe levels of a substance in or 
on a food (called a “tolerance”) while the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) are responsible for enforcing those tolerances.21  Under 
FIFRA, EPA will not register a pesticide until the applicant has 
obtained the necessary tolerances or exemptions in accordance 
with the FFDCA.22 
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 came about in 
large part as a compromise to address the so-called “Delaney 
Paradox,” created by the Delaney Amendment to the FFDCA, 
which set a zero tolerance for carcinogenic pesticides in 
processed foods.23  The “paradox” resulted because in effect the 
law prohibited any carcinogenic substance in processed foods, 
even if it posed only a de minimis risk, while allowing the same 
substance to be present in raw foods.24 
The FQPA repealed the Delaney clause and contains, for 
the first time, provisions specifically designed to protect the 
health of infants and children.25  This new focus on the impacts 
of pesticides on infants and children was more than justified 
and deserves attention. 
In 1993, after several years of study, the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) released a report entitled Pesticides in the 
Diets of Infants and Children,26 on the subject of whether 
pesticides posed special risks to children because of heavier 
exposure and greater susceptibility to the toxic effects of such 
                                                          
 20. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2000). 
 21. See Miller, supra note 8, at 697-98. 
 22. See 40 C.F.R. § 152.112(g) (2004); Linda J. Fisher et al., A 
Practitioner’s Guide to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: 
Part III, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,629, 10,646 (1994).  The EPA 
Administrator has authority under section 408 of the FFDCA to issue 
“exemptions” for pesticides for which a tolerance is unnecessary to protect 
public health.  See Miller, supra note 8, at 697-98. 
 23. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994) (setting “zero tolerance” 
standard for carcinogenic pesticides in processed foods), and 21 U.S.C. § 
346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (defining “safe” with respect to a tolerance for a 
pesticide chemical residue), with Fisher et al., supra note 22, at 10,648-49, 
Miller, supra note 8, at 693-95, and RODGERS, supra note 9, § 5.22, at 282-88. 
 24. See Watnick, supra note 3, at 1324-26. 
 25. See id. at 1329-31. 
 26. COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND 
CHILDREN (1993). 
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chemicals.27  The NAS study, along with subsequent research, 
supports the conclusion that infants and children are indeed 
more vulnerable to health damage from pesticides.  This is 
because the dietary diversity of children is extremely low and 
they are more vulnerable to the effects of toxic chemicals as 
their cells and organs develop.  Also, pound for pound, children 
breathe, eat, and drink more than adults, and engage in 
activities closer to the ground where pesticide residues in air, 
dirt, and on floors are often the greatest.28 
However, the NAS study concluded that insufficient data 
on children’s food consumption and pesticide toxicity prevented 
them from determining a precise level of increased risk to 
children posed by pesticides.29  The NAS study’s authors 
recommended that an additional child-specific uncertainty 
factor be used routinely in setting pesticide tolerances 
whenever toxicity data was incomplete to account for potential 
vulnerability in children.30  It was these and other findings that 
led to several key provisions of the FQPA.31 
The FQPA requires EPA to quantitatively assess the risks 
of a pesticide residue and the potential for aggregate exposure 
and use an additional tenfold margin of safety when setting 
pesticide tolerances unless reliable data suggests some other 
margin will be safe for infants and children.32  As EPA 
                                                          
 27. See id. at 267-363; WARGO, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
 28. See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, TROUBLE ON THE FARM: GROWING 
UP WITH PESTICIDES IN AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES, ch. 2 (1998), 
http://www.nrdc.org/health/kids/farm/farminx.asp; WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 
1; WARGO, supra note 1, at 10-13; Denise Koch et al., Temporal Association of 
Children’s Pesticide Exposure and Agricultural Spraying: Report of a 
Longitudinal Biological Monitoring Study, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 829, 
829 (2002) (stating that children may be more susceptible to the effects of 
pesticides than adults and finding that pesticide spraying in agricultural 
regions can increase children’s exposure in the absence of parental work 
contact with pesticides or residential proximity to pesticide-treated farmland), 
available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2002/110p829-
833koch/EHP110p829PDF.PDF; Lanphear, supra note 1, at 203-04. 
 29. See COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND 
CHILDREN, supra note 26, at 360-63; WARGO, supra note 1, at 12. 
 30. COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, 
supra note 26, at 361. 
 31. See Watnick, supra note 3, at 1324-32 (detailing legislative history of 
FQPA). 
 32. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(vi) (2000); Watnick, supra note 3, at 1342 
(citing OFFICE OF PREVENTION, EPA, 10X SAFETY FACTOR SHEET, PESTICIDES 
AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 1 (1999)); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET:  
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM PESTICIDES (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/kidpesticide.htm (discussing FQPA’s 
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generally uses a hundred-fold margin of safety, this results in 
potentially multiplying that margin by an additional factor of 
ten when there is evidence of developmental toxicity or when 
exposure data is incomplete.33  Moreover, in assessing the risk 
of the pesticide chemical residue, the FQPA directs EPA to 
consider: (1) information about consumption patterns of infants 
and children that are likely to result in disproportionately high 
consumption of foods containing pesticide residues in 
comparison to the general population, (2) special susceptibility 
of infants and children to pesticide residues, (3) information 
concerning cumulative effects on infants and children of 
substances that have a common mechanism of toxicity, (4) 
information to ensure a reasonable certainty of no harm to 
infants and children from aggregate exposure to pesticide 
residues, and (5) other relevant factors relating to data, 
toxicity, dietary consumption patterns, and information 
“concerning the variability of the sensitivities of major 
identifiable subgroups of consumers.”34 
If nothing else, the FQPA is significant in that it is one of 
the only examples of environmental legislation that contains 
specific provisions for the protection of infants and children.35  
                                                          
requirement of an additional safety factor for children in setting pesticide 
residue standards). 
 33. See Watnick, supra note 3, at 1339.  For a discussion of the tenfold 
safety factors, see OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE FQPA SAFETY FACTOR(S) IN 
TOLERANCE ASSESSMENT A-3 (Feb. 2002).  Some argue that EPA policy 
documents and practice have reversed the burden of proof in some instances 
and failed to impose one or more of the safety factors in the face of data 
uncertainty.  See Natural Res. Def. Council, Re: Draft Science Policy 
Document, “Consideration of the FQPA Safety Factor and Other Uncertainty 
Factors in Cumulative Risk Assessment of Chemicals Sharing a Common 
Mechanism of Toxicity,” Docket No. OPP-00759 (April 29, 2002) at 3-4 
[hereinafter NRDC Comments]; see also OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,  CONSIDERATION OF THE FQPA SAFETY FACTOR AND 
OTHER UNCERTAINTY FACTORS IN CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF 
CHEMICALS SHARING A COMMON MECHANISM OF TOXICITY 10 (Draft, Feb. 28, 
2002) (stating that the absence of data on common mechanism toxicity does 
not automatically warrant the application of an uncertainty or safety factor, 
but that risk assessors should evaluate the overall value of the missing study); 
WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 42 (stating that EPA typically has not imposed the 
FQPA safety factor in setting pesticide tolerances and questioning what the 
EPA considers “reliable data” to justify departure from the presumptive safety 
factor). 
 34. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)-(D) (2000). 
 35. See David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution 
for Environmental Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 138 (2005) (noting that 
“[t]he FQPA is arguably the first environmental statute that addresses 
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Moreover, the law’s provisions relating to children rely much 
more heavily on the “precautionary principle” than cost-benefit 
analysis.  The precautionary principle is an approach to 
regulation, used widely today in European nations, which 
states that if an activity might threaten human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if 
some of the cause-and-effect relationships are not fully 
established scientifically.36 
By contrast, under a cost-benefit analysis, the potential 
risks of an activity are merely weighed against the potential 
benefits, and as long as the latter are greater than the former, 
the activity should be allowed. While cost-benefit analysis is 
central to the determination of whether to register a pesticide 
under FIFRA, the FQPA creates an overlay requiring increased 
margins of safety in order to protect children’s health, even in 
the absence of data showing a causal relationship between the 
pesticide and harm to children’s health.37  As a result, the 
FQPA, based on the findings of the NAS study, promotes the 
precautionary principle over traditional cost-benefit analysis 
used to register pesticides generally under FIFRA.38 
                                                          
population-wide variation in toxic susceptibilities” in its focus on infants and 
children). 
 36. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE 13-20 (2005) (describing the precautionary principle and arguing 
that it is incoherent and can lead to paralysis, but that applying a refined 
version of the precautionary principle in cases where the risk of catastrophic 
damage exists makes sense); see also FARBER, supra note 15, at 6-7, 170-71; 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION 6-10, 23-24 (2002); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing 
the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1553, 1553-84 (2002).  The European Union recently proposed a draft 
regulation on chemicals known as REACH (Registration, Evaluation and 
Authorisation of Chemicals) that expressly adopts the precautionary principle 
in restricting the use of a wide range of chemicals used in everything from 
medicine to farming.  Under the proposed regulations, REACH “reverses the 
burden of proof” by forcing industry to provide evidence on the safe use of their 
products before they can be marketed rather than forcing government 
authorities to prove the products are dangerous in order to restrict them.  See 
EUROPEAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, EU CHEMICAL SAFETY PROPOSAL – 
REACH, June 28, 2005 [hereinafter REACH], available at 
http://www.etuc.org/a/496; see also KEN GEISER & JOEL TICKNER, LOWELL 
CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION, NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN 
CHEMICALS POLICY: DRIVERS, SCOPE, AND STATUS 7 (2003) (discussing history 
of development and use of the precautionary principle in Europe). 
 37. See NRDC Comments, supra note 33, at 3-4 (arguing that the EPA 
policy applies a lesser safety factor or no safety factor at all for children in the 
absence of data justifying the need for the tenfold factor). 
 38. Other provisions of the FQPA require EPA to reassess the more than 
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EPA’s implementation of the FQPA has been subject to 
significant criticism, ranging from its failure to review the 
approximately 10,000 existing pesticide tolerances by 2006 
under the new provisions,39 failure to presumptively apply the 
tenfold safety factor to protect children,40 and failure to require 
manufacturers to test for the broader range of toxic effects in 
adults and children set forth in the law.41  Some of these 
criticisms have led to lawsuits against the Agency discussed 
later in this Article.  A review of these criticisms leads to the 
conclusion that EPA so far has failed to create an adequate 
regulatory structure under the FQPA to effectively protect 
children’s health to the full extent available under the law.42 
However, despite EPA’s failure to fully implement the 
law’s precautionary principle with regard to children’s health 
and pesticides, the fact remains that the FQPA on its face 
rejects a cost-benefit analysis when it comes to pesticide 
tolerances and their impact on children.  While EPA’s 
shortcomings to date do not mean the agency will never use the 
FQPA to its full potential, this Article explores whether 
                                                          
9,000 pesticide tolerances and exemptions in existence at the time the new law 
was enacted to determine whether those tolerances meet the more stringent 
FQPA standards.  See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(q) (2000); American Farm Bureau v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D.D.C. 2000).  As amended, the 
FFDCA sets forth a three-tiered schedule for reassessing existing tolerances 
and exemptions, and requires that thirty-three percent be reassessed by 
August 1999, sixty-six percent by August 2002, and 100 percent by August 
2006.  See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(q)(1).  EPA is to give priority in the reassessment 
to those tolerances and exemptions that “appear to pose the greatest risk to 
public health.”  21 U.S.C. § 346a(q)(2).  As of February 15, 2005, EPA had 
reassessed over 7,140 of the 9,728 tolerances for pesticides in existence on 
August 2, 1996.  See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Whitman, No. C 99-03701 
WHA, 2001 WL 1221774, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2001); Environmental Prot. 
Agency: Alachlor, Carbaryl, Diazinon, Disulfoton, Pirimiphos-methyl, and 
Vinclozolin; Proposed Tolerance Revocations, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,621 
(Mar. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (stating that EPA had 
reassessed over 7,140 tolerances as of February 14, 2005).  Finally, the law 
requires EPA to promulgate regulations governing the establishment of 
tolerances for pesticide uses exempted under FIFRA’s emergency provisions 
within 365 days after enactment of the FQPA.  See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(l)(6); 7 
U.S.C. § 136p (2000). 
 39. See Whitman, No. C 99-03701 WHA, 2001 WL 1221774 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 24, 2001). 
 40. See NRDC Comments, supra note 33, at 4-5; WALLINGA, supra note 4, 
at 42-43 (criticizing EPA for its failure to routinely use the FQPA tenfold 
safety factor in setting tolerances). 
 41. See, e.g., WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 47-50; Watnick, supra note 3, at 
1341-43. 
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common law claims, particularly claims against pesticide 
manufacturers that emphasize the policy goals of the FQPA, 
can act as a gap-filler to spur the creation and effective use of 
scientific data in this area. 
Section III of this Article thus evaluates case law involving 
children’s health and pesticides in both an administrative law 
and common law context.  That Section concludes that while 
direct challenges to EPA regulatory policy under the FQPA 
have been less than successful so far, common law claims 
against manufacturers may hold more promise to encourage 
the collection of valuable scientific data that can be used to 
protect children’s health. 
III. PESTICIDES AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH IN THE 
COURTS 
This Section analyzes judicial decisions involving children’s 
health and pesticides.  There are countless cases involving 
claims by children and their parents against pesticide 
manufacturers for pesticide-related damages and numerous 
other suits involving general challenges to EPA and other 
agencies regarding pesticide-related rulemaking.  However, the 
cases discussed below are limited to those cases in which the 
courts have wrestled specifically with evidentiary or policy 
matters specific to children. 
As a result, these cases provide some indication of the 
availability or lack thereof of data and other studies specific to 
children and pesticides as well as how the courts are dealing 
with that evidence or lack of evidence.  This Section starts with 
an evaluation of claims against EPA and other regulatory 
agencies.  These cases tend to show that while claims against 
EPA under the FQPA have not obtained major results, 
administrative law cases in other contexts provide a roadmap 
for how courts can invoke statutory precautionary principles to 
place data-gathering incentives on pesticide manufacturers to 
avoid risks to children.  This Section then reviews common law 
tort claims by children and their parents against pesticide 
manufacturers and users.  This evaluation establishes that in 
light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bates,43 common 
law tort claims based on negligent testing and negligent design 
principles can act as a catalyst to spur manufacturers to collect 
and evaluate data not currently required by EPA. Courts can 
                                                          
 43. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
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look to the precautionary principle embodied in the FQPA to do 
so. 
A. AGENCY CASES BEFORE THE FQPA 
Not surprisingly, even before the enactment of the FQPA, 
state and federal courts were called upon to consider the 
impacts of pesticides on children’s health in an administrative 
law context.  A review of these early cases provides some 
valuable historic lessons about the ability of the judiciary to 
promote sound policy regarding children’s health and 
pesticides. 
One notable case involving children’s health and pesticides 
in an administrative law context is National Association of 
Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall.44  In that case, 
private nonprofit organizations representing farmworker 
families sued the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor 
over regulations governing employment of children younger 
than twelve years of age for harvesting crops.  In general, 
federal law prohibited the employment of children under twelve 
years of age, but a 1977 amendment to the law allowed 
employers to apply to the Secretary for a waiver of the child 
labor laws in order to employ ten- and eleven-year-old children 
for harvesting short-season crops.45  Such waivers could be 
granted only if, among other things, the levels and types of 
pesticides and chemicals used “would not have an adverse 
effect on the health or well-being of the individuals to whom 
the waiver would apply.”46  Such findings by the Secretary to 
grant a waiver had to be “based on objective data submitted by 
the applicant.”47 
In attempting to enact regulations under the 1977 
amendments, the Department of Labor was faced with a 
problem in setting uniform standards with little or no data 
regarding the impact of pesticides on children.  Indeed, when 
the first set of regulations were proposed, representatives of 
EPA, other agencies, and the public commented that 
epidemiologic information for pesticide effects on children was 
essentially nonexistent,48 that children are more vulnerable to 
                                                          
 44. 628 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 45. See id. at 606-07; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(c) (2000). 
 46. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 607 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(A) (1979)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See  Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on 
Toxicology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
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harmful effects of pesticides than adults, and that there was no 
basis on which to set standards to protect children from the 
adverse effects of pesticide exposure.49 
Despite this lack of data, the Department approved 
numerous pesticides for use with “preharvest intervals” before 
children could enter the field.  It granted these approvals even 
though EPA argued that the available data was insufficient to 
make a decision on the safety of children exposed to the 
pesticides, several of which were either known carcinogens or 
found to be dangerous in the commissioned study.50 
In response to a challenge to the approvals, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Bazelon, 
began by framing the issue as “[h]ow can an administrator set 
safety standards in the absence of adequate scientific 
evidence?”51  In answering that question, the court 
acknowledged that assuring safety in pesticide exposure “may 
be beyond the range of scientific certainty at present.”52  
However, the court rejected the argument that the Secretary 
could not delay the issuance of waivers until he received 
assurances that certain pesticides were absolutely safe or 
presented zero risk because the state of scientific knowledge 
could not soon, or ever, provide such assurances.53  The court 
focused on the fact that the statute required a finding based on 
“objective data” submitted by the applicant that the pesticides 
would not have an effect on the health or well-being of the 
individuals to whom the waiver would apply, but the Secretary 
had no data that even tended to point in that direction.54  The 
court took issue with the district court’s conclusion that the 
state of scientific knowledge could not in the near future or ever 
provide sufficient assurances for safety.  The court held that 
the study the Department had commissioned indicated that 
data could be generated “time permitting,” but that the 
Department did not seek any such studies before issuing its 
                                                          
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 413 (2d ed. 2000) (defining epidemiology as “the 
study of the incidence and distribution of disease in human populations”); see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 158.340 (2004) (regarding toxicology data requirements for 
pesticide registration). 
 49. See Marshall, 628 F.2d at 607-08. 
 50. See id. at 609-10. 
 51. Id. at 606. 
 52. Id. at 617 (citing NATIONAL ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY: A FIVE-YEAR OUTLOOK 462 (1979)). 
 53. See id. at 617. 
 54. See id. at 617-18. 
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lists of pesticides.55  Significantly, the court rejected the 
premise that in the absence of good evidence, the Secretary was 
justified in relying on the “best available evidence” in light of 
the express statutory language requiring “objective data” to 
support a waiver.56 
The Marshall opinion is significant for several reasons.  
First, throughout the opinion, the court cites extensively to 
studies, data, and reports on the impact of pesticides on 
children’s health and the lack of data available to establish 
safety standards.  Second, the opinion is an example of the 
adoption of the precautionary principle over the more often-
used cost-benefit analysis in making decisions that impact 
economic values on the one hand and public health and 
environmental values on the other.57 
Thus, helped along by the “objective data” standard in the 
statute at issue, the court was able to place the protection of 
children above any economic concerns. As a result, the court 
put the burden on the defendants to create “objective data” to 
justify continued use of pesticides in the presence of workers 
under twelve years of age.  In doing so, the court was able to 
use its authority to promote gathering data and information 
that could be used in further studies and legal proceedings.58 
While there are certainly many other examples of courts 
refusing to place such an information-gathering burden on 
manufacturers to justify use of a pesticide, those cases 
generally arise in the FIFRA regulatory context, where cost-
benefit analysis is expressly built into the statute.  For 
instance, in a pre-FQPA case, Love v. Thomas,59 the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the use of the precautionary 
principle over cost-benefit analysis in the context of pesticide 
risks to children.  In Love, farmers and food processors sought a 
preliminary injunction against an EPA emergency suspension 
order under FIFRA preventing further sale, distribution, or use 
of pesticide products containing dinoseb.60  EPA had issued the 
                                                          
 55. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 618-19. 
 56. Id. at 619 & n.73 (comparing other statutes that require safety 
standards based on “best available evidence”). 
 57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 58. See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Jorling, 85 N.Y.2d 382 
(1995) (upholding state agency ban on pesticide products with high 
concentrations of DEET based on evidence of risk to human health and 
particularly children’s health). 
 59. 858 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 60. See id. at 1350-51. 
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order based on preliminary studies showing that dinoseb may 
cause serious health risks to persons exposed to it, including 
sterility in men and birth defects in the unborn children of 
pregnant women.61 
The Ninth Circuit held that EPA had acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner in failing to consider the economic 
benefits of dinoseb in issuing its order.  The court concluded 
that EPA had failed to adequately study the economic impact 
on the plaintiffs and their crops and thus failed to conduct the 
necessary balancing required by the statute.62  Indeed, the 
court used strong language in stating that “[w]ith all due 
respect to the EPA and its overworked staff, such insensitivity 
to the local economic problems caused by its decision is 
unbecoming and inappropriate.”63  In reaching its decision, the 
court spent little time discussing EPA’s data on the pesticide’s 
potential harm to unborn children and significant time 
discussing EPA’s failure to consider data regarding the 
economic benefits of the pesticide.  As a result, the court placed 
the information-gathering burden squarely on EPA, rather 
than those wishing to manufacture and use the pesticide. 
In many ways, the Love case is the mirror image of the 
Marshall case.  In Marshall, the lack of evidence quantifying 
the pesticide’s risks meant that the pesticide could not be used.  
In Love, the lack of evidence quantifying the pesticide’s benefits 
meant that the restrictions on the pesticide were improper 
despite potential harm to unborn children.  This difference in 
result is due, for the most part, to the very different provisions 
of the two statutes at issue.  While the labor law in Marshall 
required “objective data” to allow a pesticide to be used with 
child workers under twelve years of age, the key provisions of 
FIFRA at issue in Love expressly incorporated a cost-benefit 
analysis in determining whether a pesticide should be 
suspended.64 
                                                          
 61. See id. at 1350. 
 62. See id. at 1357-62. 
 63. Id. at 1362.  The court went on to reverse the district court’s 
injunction imposing conditions on the use of dinoseb on the grounds that the 
district court’s authority was limited to stay the EPA order or leave it in place.  
See id. at 1364 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(4)).  The court thus remanded the 
case to the lower court to consider whether it would have been willing to allow 
the unrestricted use of dinoseb.  See Love, 858 F.2d at 1364. 
 64. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (2000) (stating that a pesticide shall be 
registered if, among other things, it will not cause “unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment” when used in accordance with widespread and 
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What one can take away from these cases is that the courts 
can exercise their authority to encourage manufacturers to 
obtain new data to justify use of their pesticides in the presence 
of a statutory precautionary principle.  While the Marshall case 
illustrates this in an administrative law context, such 
principles can apply equally to tort claims against pesticide 
manufacturers. 
B. MORE AGENCY CASES: THE FQPA 
It did not take long after the enactment of the FQPA for 
the lawsuits to begin.  However, a review of these cases shows 
that at least so far, direct challenges to EPA action under the 
FQPA have been less than effective, and the courts have rarely 
reached the merits of any dispute.  Thus, in the short term, it 
may be wise to look beyond administrative law challenges to 
the potential of tort law to spur greater protection for children’s 
health. 
The first lawsuit, American Farm Bureau v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency,65 was brought by pesticide 
manufacturers and farm groups against EPA alleging that the 
agency had failed to: (1) set tolerances for emergency 
exemptions under FIFRA, (2) promulgate data requirements 
for establishing and continuing tolerances, (3) update data 
requirements for registering pesticides under FIFRA, (4) 
comply with various data collection requirements to complete 
tolerance assessments, and (5) follow appropriate rulemaking 
procedures in implementing a FQPA infant and child safety 
factor policy.66 
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed 
most of the claims for lack of standing.  Of most interest for 
purposes of this Article is the plaintiffs’ argument that they 
had suffered economic injury “as a result of the uncertainty 
about pesticide safety created by the EPA’s alleged failure to 
meet its tolerance reassessment schedule.”67  Plaintiffs further 
                                                          
commonly recognized practice); 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000) (defining 
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as taking into account the 
“economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide”). 
 65. 121 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 66. See id. at 89-90.  This last argument involved the EPA’s alleged 
failure to apply the presumptive tenfold safety factor for infants and children 
required by the FQPA in the absence of “reliable data” showing a different 
margin of safety should be used.  See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (2000). 
 67. American Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 99. 
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alleged that they would have to expend funds on “public 
education and outreach” to combat “misinformation about crop 
protection and other chemical products” and would suffer from 
“product deselection by consumers, growers, and pesticide 
manufacturers.”68  In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim of economic 
injury, the court held that the alleged injuries were not 
concrete and particularized, and moreover, the plaintiffs failed 
to demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged harm 
and EPA’s alleged inaction.69 
The American Farm Bureau case was quickly followed by a 
challenge from the other side. The Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) and other environmental groups sued EPA for 
inadequate regulation of pesticides under the FQPA in Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Whitman.70  Initially, the 
plaintiffs alleged that EPA had failed to meet the tolerance-
reassessment deadlines and priorities in the FQPA.  Most of 
the original parties reached a settlement, but the settlement 
was later challenged by the American Farm Bureau and other 
farming and pesticide manufacturing interests.  In dismissing 
the challenge to the settlement, the court rejected the 
argument that the consent decree would have “devastating 
economic consequences” on the manufacturing and farming 
community, noting that the law does not require EPA to assess 
the economic consequences of performing reevaluations.71  The 
court did note, however, that “[t]o the extent EPA fails to 
properly account for the economic benefits of a given pesticide 
in any final rule, judicial review will be available.”72 
The next case involving the FQPA, Croplife America v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,73 was a challenge by 
pesticide manufacturers and trade associations to an EPA 
directive that it would no longer accept third-party human 
studies in regulatory decisionmaking.  The petitioners alleged 
that the directive was a binding regulation rather than a policy 
statement and required formal notice and comments prior to 
enactment.  The petitioners further alleged they were injured 
because the new policy precluded EPA’s consideration of 
studies petitioners had previously used to verify the safety of 
                                                          
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. No. C 99-03701 WHA, 2001 WL 1221774 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2001). 
 71. See id. at *20. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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their products.74  In this 2003 opinion, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that EPA’s broad moratorium on the use of third-
party human test data (which had been allowed on a case-by-
case basis in the past) was a binding regulation enforceable 
against the petitioners and subject to notice and comment 
requirements.75  Once again, the case did not allow the court to 
reach the merits of data requirements or other issues at the 
heart of the FQPA. 
Finally, in 2004, in New York v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency,76 states and nonprofit groups 
sued EPA for failure to apply the presumptive tenfold margin 
of safety for children in reassessing certain pesticide tolerances.  
The plaintiffs argued that by “leaving certain existing 
tolerances in place for these pesticides without applying the 
tenfold margin of safety, the EPA failed to take into account 
scientific data demonstrating serious safety risks.”77  The 
plaintiffs also alleged that EPA’s failure to designate 
farmworkers’ children as a “major identifiable subgroup” 
violated the FQPA because of their heightened vulnerability to 
pesticide exposures.78  Although the allegations in this case 
went to the heart of the FQPA requirements relating to 
children, the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
The court reasoned that section 408(h)(1) of the FQPA vested 
jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals and that the 
plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.79  
Thus, once again, efforts to reach the merits of the suit were 
derailed. 
Efforts to force EPA to fulfill its mandate under the FQPA 
continue.  In June 2005, NRDC and other groups filed suit 
against EPA in the Northern District of California for failure to 
designate children of farmworkers as a “major identifiable 
subgroup” subject to special protection under the FQPA.80  In 
support of their claims, the plaintiffs detailed the fact that 
                                                          
 74. See id. at 884. 
 75. Id. at 881. 
 76. 350 F. Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 77. Id. at 432. 
 78. See id. at 433. 
 79. See id. at 438 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 346a(h)(1), (g)(2)(C) (2000)). 
 80. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus at 10, Pesticide Action Network North America v. United 
States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 4:05CV02312, (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2005); see 
also 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D) (2000). 
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more than one million children of farmworkers and farmers live 
in this country, and more than 300,000 children under the age 
of six live on farms.  The plaintiffs cited studies showing that 
children are at heightened risk of harm from pesticides and 
that children on farms, because of their proximity to direct 
application of pesticides, are at even greater risk.81 
The plaintiffs alleged that EPA had failed to respond to an 
October 1998 petition by NRDC and other groups requesting 
the agency to identify children living on or near farms as a 
“major identifiable subgroup.”  The plaintiffs sought a 
declaratory judgment that EPA’s failure to respond to the 
petition violated the Administrative Procedure Act82 and asked 
the court to compel the agency to respond to the petition in 
ninety days.83  In August 2005, the plaintiffs voluntarily 
dismissed that action without prejudice when EPA acted on the 
NRDC’s original petition through its issuance of an “Order 
Denying Objections to Issuance of Tolerances” on August 10, 
2005.84 
NRDC and other nonprofits followed the dismissal of this 
suit with a set of new lawsuits that are being consolidated in 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  These lawsuits challenge 
directly EPA’s August 10, 2005 Order, its refusal to treat farm 
children as a major identifiable subgroup under the FQPA, 
EPA’s refusal to apply a tenfold safety factor on certain 
pesticides in the absence of developmental neurotoxicity testing 
(DNT) data establishing that the pesticides at issue are not 
neurotoxic, and EPA’s action on other pesticide tolerance issues 
under the FQPA.85  What the court will do with this most 
                                                          
 81. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus, supra note 80, at 4-10 (citing NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, supra note 28; NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HIDDEN DANGER: 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH THREATS IN THE LATINO COMMUNITY (2004); and 
COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra 
note 26). 
 82. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e), 555(b) (2000). 
 83. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus, supra note 80, at 11. 
 84. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(a)(1), Pesticide Action North America v. United States Envtl. Prot. 
Agency,  No. 05-02312-CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2005); see also Order Denying 
Objections to Issuance of Tolerances, 70 Fed. Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 10, 2005). 
 85. See Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. United States 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-75255 (9th  Cir., Sept. 1, 2005) (appealing EPA 
Order); Notice of Selection of Venue by MDL Panel, Croplife America v. United 
States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-1343 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2005) (consolidating 
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recent suit remains to be seen.  However, the cases so far show 
that FQPA administrative litigation is in its early stages where 
decisions on the merits can force EPA and/or pesticide 
manufacturers to adequately implement the law’s provisions.  
Indeed, the level of analysis of children’s health issues in the 
cases prior to the enactment of the FQPA is much more robust 
than in cases brought under the FQPA itself.  While this will 
certainly change as more agency actions are taken under the 
FQPA, for now it may be prudent to consider whether lawsuits 
beyond challenging EPA’s administration of the FQPA may 
help spur additional data collection and promote protection of 
children’s health. 
C. DATA GAPS AND PREEMPTION: THE MANUFACTURER CASES 
Lawsuits seeking damages for pesticide exposure have 
been around since before the 1972 FIFRA amendments.  
Problems of proof, even in meritorious cases, have historically 
posed significant barriers.  This is particularly true for cases 
involving children, when even less scientific evidence on 
exposure levels and effects is available.86  As shown below, the 
problem is circular.  Because pesticide manufacturers still have 
not conducted sufficient studies in many cases to establish a 
link or lack thereof between pesticide exposure and harm to 
children, such data is not available to plaintiffs when such 
harm may occur.  For instance, EPA does not require even 
basic neurotoxicity testing in order to register a pesticide under 
FIFRA, even though a protocol for conducting such tests was 
extensively validated years ago.87  This lack of data makes such 
lawsuits expensive, difficult, and in the end, often (but not 
always) unsuccessful.  The problem is, of course, exacerbated by 
the fact that in the absence of regulatory requirements, 
pesticide manufacturers have no incentive to conduct testing, 
                                                          
actions challenging EPA’s August 10, 2005 Order in the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit); Amended Petition for Review, Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-4773 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2005);   see 
also EPA, Notice to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation of 
Multicircuit Petitions for Review (Sept. 27, 2005). 
 86. See, e.g., WARGO, supra note 1, at 177-78 (stating there is no 
systematic method or model appropriate to predict variation in age-related 
susceptibility to toxins); Schon, supra note 3, at 708-09 (noting that it was not 
until the 1990s that studies and publicity emphasized that children were not 
“little adults” for purposes of data collection and regulation with regard to 
pesticides). 
 87. See WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 61. 
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even when protocols are available, because such data could 
then be used against them in lawsuits or in efforts to cancel the 
pesticide registration.88 
Moreover, until recently, federal preemption under FIFRA 
posed a nearly insurmountable barrier to many claims for 
pesticide damages against manufacturers.  As discussed below, 
although evidentiary problems remain a significant hurdle, the 
federal preemption problem has lessened significantly as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Bates.  Thus, 
Bates provides an opening for the common law to act as a 
catalyst to improve pesticide testing and design that better 
protect children’s health. 
1. Scientific Evidence Hurdles 
Examples of children who have been prevented from 
proceeding to trial against manufacturers for alleged pesticide-
related damages are easy to find.  This is in large part a result 
of the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.89  In Daubert, the Court 
announced a new standard for admissibility of scientific 
evidence in federal court based on Federal Rules of Evidence 
702 and 703.  In order to allow expert, scientific testimony to be 
presented at trial, the trial judge must determine at the outset 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts.90  Thus, 
before admitting scientific evidence, the trial judge must act as 
a “gatekeeper”91 regarding what scientific evidence can be 
presented to the jury. 
The Court further refined this direction in General Electric 
                                                          
 88. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of 
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 805 (1997) (noting the irony in the 
current common law tort system—requiring a plaintiff to prove causation in 
all cases allows a manufacturer to escape liability when the plaintiff cannot 
prove the manufacturer’s product caused the plaintiff’s harm, “even though 
this proof problem is a direct result of the manufacturer’s inadequate testing”); 
Wendy E. Wagner, Common Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 
1619, 1639 (2004) (“Remaining ignorant about the potential harms caused by 
one’s products and activities increases the likelihood that the actor can avoid 
tort suits and stay out of the range of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ radar.”). 
 89. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 90. See id. at 592-93; see also id. at 593-94 (discussing the four factors 
courts are directed to consider when evaluating whether to admit testimony). 
 91. See id. at 597. 
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Co. v. Joiner,92 in which it affirmed the trial court’s rejection of 
each of the plaintiff’s proffered animal and epidemiological 
studies in support of plaintiff’s claim that exposure to PCBs 
caused his cancer.  In doing so, the Court let stand the trial 
court’s rejection of a weight-of-the-evidence approach to reach 
conclusions on causation and risk in favor of making each study 
stand on its own.93  Because the defendants were able to attack 
each of the plaintiff’s studies separately (for example, based on 
the age of the animals tested in one study, and the 
circumstances of the humans impacted in another), the ability 
to evaluate the evidence based on its totality was lost.94 
Commentators have persuasively argued that this study-
by-study approach prevents experts in toxic tort cases from 
applying a cumulative weight-of-the-evidence approach that is 
used overwhelmingly in risk assessments by scientists and 
agencies.95  As a result, judges who may lack any scientific 
expertise are using non-scientific methods to prevent scientific 
testimony from being heard at trial.96  Certainly one can 
persuasively argue that the standard for holding a defendant 
legally liable for significant damages in a toxic tort case should 
require more evidence than that used by a regulatory agency to 
set standards prospectively.  However, the Daubert standard 
was designed to address only the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, not require plaintiffs’ experts to demonstrate before 
trial that each study relied upon can on its own prove the 
plaintiff’s case.  Thus, using the arguably unscientific and 
narrow inquiry reflected in Joiner is both counterproductive to 
the goals of the tort system and excessively burdensome for 
plaintiffs in many pesticide cases. 
Two Eighth Circuit cases demonstrate the significant 
impact of Daubert and Joiner in cases involving children’s 
                                                          
 92. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 93. See id. at 144-46. 
 94. See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and 
Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 19-23 (2001) (discussing Joiner’s “corpuscular” 
approach to Daubert and arguing that such an approach to determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony results in courts imposing a much less 
scientific approach to causation than regulatory agencies charged with 
protecting citizens from risk). 
 95. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Daubert and the Proper Role for the 
Courts in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH S92, S95 (Supp. 1 2005). 
 96. See id. 
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health and pesticides.  In two cases involving different 
plaintiffs, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs, each who 
suffered from birth defects allegedly resulting from the 
mother’s exposure to pesticides containing the chemical 
Dursban during the early stages of pregnancy, could not go 
forward with a negligent design claim against the 
manufacturer.97  In the first Dursban case, the court reasoned 
that three scholarly articles discussing the connection between 
the chemical and the birth defects did “not provide the requisite 
support” to show causation.98  In the second case, the court of 
appeals affirmed the lower court’s determination that the 
causation opinions of the physician and chemist hired by 
plaintiffs did not meet the scientific methodology required by 
Daubert.99 
Notably, in the latter case, the lower court concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ experts did not present sufficient evidence that 
Dursban is capable of causing birth defects or that the mother’s 
exposure to Dursban during pregnancy caused the birth defects 
at issue.100  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on studies 
conducted by Dow, letters from Dow to EPA, and articles 
written by one of the plaintiffs’ experts on the subject.  The 
court found that the experts were not able to point to 
“epidemiological studies consistently and repeatedly 
demonstrating any statistical association between the exposure 
of pregnant women to Dursban and any increase in human 
birth defects.”101  The court also held that there were no 
appropriate animal models because the dose amounts were not 
comparable.102 
In discussing the available evidence, the court noted that 
although Dursban had been on the market for over thirty 
years, there was no data showing that increases in the type of 
birth defects at issue in the case paralleled the increase in sales 
and use of Dursban.103  The court noted an epidemiological 
                                                          
 97. See National Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 
165 F.3d 602, 610 (8th Cir. 1999); National Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, 
Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 133 F.3d 1132, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), aff’g 
965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 1996). 
 98. National Bank of Commerce, 165 F.3d at 609. 
 99. See 133 F.3d at 1132. 
 100. See National Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 
965 F. Supp. 1490, 1519 (E.D. Ark. 1996). 
 101. Id. at 1528. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 1552 app. F.  Significantly, there is no national tracking 
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study had been conducted on Dursban which failed to find any 
link between the pesticide and birth defects.  In response to the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the study was not reliable and should 
not be given weight, the court stated that it would be better if 
more studies were available, but the study was “the only such 
study,” so it had to be carefully considered.104 
Similarly, in a case from the District Court for the District 
of West Virginia, the court held that the plaintiffs’ animal 
studies and in vitro tests tending to show that the plaintiff’s 
birth defects were caused by the mother’s exposure to the 
fungicide Benlate were not reliable.105  While acknowledging 
that animal testing and in vitro studies can often be useful in 
the field of human toxicology, the court held that the proffered 
studies were not reliable because the dose rates were not 
comparable to human exposure levels and because other 
human and animal studies tended to show no link between the 
pesticide and birth defects.106 
These cases are merely examples of the difficulties children 
face in simply getting to a jury, much less recovering damages, 
from alleged exposure to pesticides.  Certainly, it is improper to 
hold manufacturer defendants liable for damages if the 
plaintiffs cannot present sufficient evidence to establish 
causation.  The problem, however, is that the lack of data is not 
always a function of a lack of causal connection between the 
                                                          
system for birth defects resulting from pesticides or other factors, making such 
data virtually impossible to collect.  See, e.g., Services, Education, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 2002: Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the H. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 322 (2002) (statement of Louis Stokes, 
H. Rep. from Ohio). 
 104. See National Bank of Commerce, 965 F. Supp. at 1554 app. F. 
 105. See Bourne v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 
482, 495-99 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), aff’d, 85 F. App’x 964 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 106. See id.  For criticism of courts rejecting animal studies despite the fact 
that many scientists consider animal studies more reliable than 
epidemiological studies, see Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of 
Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S61-S62 (Supp. 1 2005) 
(giving an example of a court rejecting that animal studies can ever support 
causation); Carl Cranor, Scientific Inferences in the Laboratory and the Law, 
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S121, S123-S124 (Supp. 1 2005) (citing court 
requirements for human epidemiological evidence even where such evidence is 
less reliable than other existing evidence or unavailable); and Ronald L. 
Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude Essential Scientific 
Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S30, S31 (Supp. 1 
2005) (stating that while some judges may have claimed that results from 
animal studies cannot be extrapolated to humans, “this opinion is contrary to 
the positions of all public health agencies, both national and international”). 
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pesticide and harm, but simply a lack of available data because 
the studies have not been required by EPA or anyone else as 
part of the FIFRA registration process. 
Indeed, the epidemiological studies many courts appear to 
require cannot even be conducted because of ethical problems 
with exposing humans to potentially harmful pesticides for 
scientific purposes.107  Moreover, manufacturers currently have 
no incentive to undertake many available animal and in vitro 
studies that could potentially provide valuable data because 
such studies are not required by EPA.108  In the absence of any 
regulatory requirement to perform toxicological studies or other 
studies before or after the registration process is complete, any 
additional data that calls into question the pesticide’s safety 
only serves to threaten the pesticide’s registration as well as 
provide ammunition to plaintiffs who allege they have been 
damaged by the pesticide.109 
Imposing requirements that plaintiffs provide data that is 
best collected by the manufacturer or data that cannot be 
collected at all under current ethical policy is directly contrary 
to the statutory directive in the FQPA that in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, protection of children’s health should 
prevail.  Instead, many courts presently err on the side of no 
protection for children’s health.  This problem has only been 
exacerbated by Daubert,110 which has been used successfully by 
                                                          
 107. See Croplife Am. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 329 F.3d 876, 884-85 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); Miller, supra note 8, at 696 (discussing ethical debates over 
accepting data from epidemiological studies using paid volunteers). 
 108. See TED SCHETTLER ET AL., GREATER BOSTON PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. 
RESPONSIBILITY, IN HARM’S WAY: TOXIC THREATS TO CHILD DEVELOPMENT 
107-08 (2000); WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 62. 
 109. See McGarity, supra note 94, at 35 (stating that the absence of 
empirical evidence in toxic tort cases is not surprising because “a company has 
very little to gain and nothing to lose from keeping itself and the world 
ignorant of the risks that its products pose to others” (citing Wendy  E. 
Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 773, 774, 794-95 (1997))). 
 110. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 3, at 494 (citing MARK J. 
CARPENTER & GEORGE W. WARE, DEFENDING PESTICIDES IN LITIGATION § 
9:10, at 217 (2003)) (noting that Daubert, in practice, has been used “to 
exclude testimony by scientific experts who fail to rely on the expensive, 
conventional studies that are conspicuously absent in pesticide research”); see 
also PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 24.04[5] (2003) (stating 
that while some believed Daubert was a more lenient standard than the Frye 
standard when Daubert was decided in 1993, subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions and lower court implementation of the new standard show that 
Daubert “erects a formidable barrier to the admissibility of expert testimony”). 
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defendant manufacturers to prevent plaintiffs from presenting 
their evidence to the jury because of the unavailability of data 
that only the manufacturers themselves are in a position to 
collect.111  This current state of affairs serves neither science 
nor children and prevents the tort system from playing any 
significant role in shaping corporate behavior. 
However, the potential of such claims to succeed is 
evidenced by cases in which the plaintiff has overcome the legal 
hurdles to recover damages.  In a 2003 case, Castillo v. E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co.,112 the Florida Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs’ evidence that a child’s rare birth defect was 
caused by his mother’s exposure to Benlate during pregnancy 
was sufficient to support a damages award.113  The child was 
born with microphthalmia, a rare birth defect involving 
severely underdeveloped eyes.114  The plaintiffs obtained a $4 
million verdict against DuPont and the farm that sprayed the 
chemical, but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that 
the scientific evidence should not have been admitted.115 
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court 
analyzed the standard for admission of scientific evidence 
applicable in Florida116 and held that human epidemiological 
studies were not necessary in this case because pesticide 
exposure of this kind was rare to begin with, and it would be 
unethical to expose humans to a substance known to cause 
birth defects in animals for testing purposes.117  In response to 
the defendants’ challenge to the use of in vitro test results, the 
court rejected the argument that the technique used was 
invalid simply because it was new.  The court stated that if it 
accepted the defendants’ position, every new scientific method 
would be denied.118  The court ultimately concluded that the 
lower appellate court had held the plaintiffs to a standard 
                                                          
 111. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 112. 854 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2003). 
 113. See id. at 1280. 
 114. See id. at 1266. 
 115. See id. at 1267-68.  The verdict allocated 99.5% of the damages 
against Du Pont and 0.5% against the farm.  See id. at 1267. 
 116. Florida, like many other states, still relies on the test set forth in Frye 
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for admission of scientific 
evidence at trial.  Under the Frye test, the court must find that the scientific 
evidence is based on methods generally accepted by the relevant members of 
the particular field.  See id. at 1268. 
 117. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1270. 
 118. See id. at 1272-73. 
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above and beyond the requirements for scientific evidence in 
Florida.119 
Similarly, in a 2000 case, the Nebraska Court of Appeals 
affirmed a verdict for the plaintiffs against a city for negligent 
spraying of the pesticide malathion, which allegedly resulted in 
a child developing a generalized seizure disorder.120  In holding 
the evidence on exposure and effects of malathion sufficient to 
support a verdict for the plaintiff, the court focused on scientific 
evidence regarding the known effects of malathion, the child’s 
symptoms, and the amount of exposure.121  At trial, the child 
was described as mild-mannered, affectionate, and loving, 
while after he was sprayed with malathion, he experienced 
seizures, irritability, and severe intellectual defects.122  In 
rejecting the defendant’s arguments that the plaintiffs had 
failed to prove sufficient levels of exposure, the court stated 
that it was “not prepared to hold that a plaintiff must prove a 
mathematically precise level of exposure in order to recover in 
a toxic tort case.”123 
The Florida and Nebraska cases stand in contrast to the 
federal cases discussed earlier in that the courts allowed the 
plaintiffs to go forward on claims based on scientific evidence 
even where that evidence was not “perfect.”  In each case, the 
court recognized that the optimal studies might not be 
available, so the plaintiffs could rely on evidence that was 
“reliable.”  Although the difference in outcomes between the 
two sets of cases may be attributable in part to the Daubert 
standard applicable in federal court, the latter cases recognize 
that the absence of a large body of research data does not mean 
the evidence that is available is so unreliable that the plaintiff 
is prevented from having his or her day in court.  The need to 
exercise such discretion in favor of admissibility is arguably 
greater in cases involving the impacts of pesticides on children, 
where the FQPA not only recognizes the link between 
pesticides and harm to children as a general matter, but 
announces a precautionary principle when it comes to data 
uncertainty. 
In the end, the message to take away from the cases is 
                                                          
 119. See id. at 1276. 
 120. See Amateis v. City of Bridgeport, No. A-98-1270, 2000 WL 868510, at 
*1, *17  (Neb. Ct. App. June 27, 2000). 
 121. See id. at *5-13. 
 122. See id. at *10-13. 
 123. Id. at *15. 
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somewhat mixed.  Liability verdicts against manufacturers can 
influence which products are on the market and what warnings 
accompany those products.124  Although manufacturers warn 
that valuable products will not be available to consumers at low 
costs without a full suite of pesticides,125 it is not difficult to 
posit that higher consumer costs may be a legitimate tradeoff 
for the removal of products that are harmful to children’s 
health and that quite possibly incur even larger and longer-
term health-related costs to society.  Certainly it is within the 
province of EPA to set that balance in the first instance under 
FIFRA’s cost-benefit provisions as well as the precautionary 
principle embodied in the FQPA.  However, the fact that 
successful lawsuits can prompt manufacturers to voluntarily 
remove pesticides from the market means that litigation can 
often remove a harmful pesticide from production more quickly 
than an EPA cancellation proceeding.126 
2. Breaking Apart FIFRA Preemption 
For nearly twenty years, there has been a massive amount 
of litigation over the extent to which FIFRA preempts state law 
tort claims under the supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.127  Although some early cases had interpreted 
                                                          
 124. See Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. in 
Support of Petitioners at 13-23, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 
1788 (2005) (No. 03-388) (using examples of pesticides voluntarily taken off 
the market as a result of tort lawsuits but prior to EPA action to show the 
ability of state tort actions to create additional incentives for manufacturers to 
protect human health and the environment). 
 125. See National Ass’n of Farmworkers Org. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 
616 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (arguing that additional burdens on growers will result in 
higher consumer prices); Brief of CropLife America and National Pest 
Management Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17-18, 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (No. 03-388) (arguing 
that without federal preemption, pesticide manufactures would be confronted 
with different standards in different states and might be forced to forgo sales 
in some states, thus depriving farmers of effective pesticides). 
 126. For instance, the numerous lawsuits by children born without eyes or 
severely underdeveloped eyes allegedly resulting from their mothers’ exposure 
to benomyl can be seen as one of the factors that led to Du Pont requesting 
cancellation of all its product registrations containing that pesticide even 
though EPA was prepared to address the matter through label warnings.  See, 
e.g., Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2003); 
Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 124, at 13-29 (using the benomyl lawsuits and other 
examples to show the ability of state tort actions to create additional 
incentives for manufacturers to protect human health and the environment). 
 127. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000) (providing the basis for FIFRA 
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FIFRA preemption narrowly to retain a significant role for 
common law tort claims, they were quickly followed by 
decisions in nearly every federal circuit applying FIFRA 
preemption broadly to prevent plaintiffs from using the tort law 
system to obtain compensation for pesticide-related harm and 
shape corporate behavior.  This changed in April 2005 with the 
Supreme Court’s Bates decision.  Bates has the potential to 
significantly expand the role tort law can play in encouraging 
pesticide manufacturers to better assess the health risks their 
products pose and develop new products through testing.  Such 
pressure has the potential to help protect children’s health 
from the adverse effects of pesticides and fill in some of the 
gaps created by EPA shortcomings in this area. 
a. The Early FIFRA Preemption Cases 
The first federal cases to consider whether FIFRA 
preempted common law claims against manufacturers for 
pesticide damages were decided in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
These cases often rejected preemption arguments and held that 
the plaintiffs could recover damages based on failure to warn 
theories.128  In a well-known case, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical 
Co.,129 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that state 
common law claims and FIFRA have separate functions, and 
while FIFRA served to ensure a pesticide did not have 
unreasonable adverse effects based on a net benefit analysis, 
                                                          
preemption).  For a detailed discussion of the history of federal preemption 
under FIFRA, see Klass, supra note 11. 
 128. See Thornton v. Fondren Green Apts., 788 F. Supp. 928, 932 (S.D. Tex. 
1992); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 
1343-45 (D. Mont. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1503-09 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson 
v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-48 (S.D. Ind. 1990); 
Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 196-99 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wilson v. Chevron 
Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762, 1986 WL 14925, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).  
But see Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024-26 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding 
state law claims impliedly preempted), vacated by Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 
U.S. 1215 (1992); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 558-60 (E.D. Mo. 
1990) (finding some state claims preempted, but not others); Herr v. Carolina 
Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (same); Kennan v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 803-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding state 
failure to warn claim impliedly preempted); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 
F. Supp. 1283, 1287-89 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (same); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 406-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding both failure to warn 
and negligent labeling claims preempted). 
 129. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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state tort law provided compensation for injury for failure to 
warn against a known and significant risk.130  The court stated 
that a pesticide manufacturer  faced with damage awards could 
assess whether to continue to sell the product or change the 
label to limit its liability.131  In rejecting preemption, the court 
also reasoned that even though FIFRA does not allow states to 
directly impose additional labeling requirements, it does allow 
states to impose more stringent constraints on the use of 
pesticides within its jurisdiction.132 
b. The Era of Broad FIFRA Preemption 
The FIFRA preemption landscape changed dramatically 
with the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc.133  The Court held that a smoker’s claim for 
damages against a cigarette manufacturer under a failure to 
warn theory was preempted by section 5(b) of the Public Health 
Smoking Act of 1969, which prohibited state regulation of 
advertising or promotion of cigarettes labeled in conformity 
with the federal law.134  In holding that the 1969 law 
preempted the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim, the Court found 
that the phrase “[n]o requirement or prohibition” did not 
distinguish between positive enactments and common law 
claims for damages.135  The Court reasoned that state 
regulation “can be as effectively exerted through an award of 
damages as through some form of preventative relief.  The 
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, 
a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.”136 
Cipollone had an immediate impact on common law tort 
claims against pesticide manufacturers.  After the decision, 
virtually all the federal circuit courts and many state supreme 
                                                          
 130. See id. at 1540-41. 
 131. See id. at 1541. 
 132. See id.  
 133. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 134. See id. at 524-25.  The operative language in the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 stated that “[n]o requirement or prohibition 
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to 
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are 
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.”  Id. at 515 (quoting the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 
Stat. 87 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000))). 
 135. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521. 
 136. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 
247 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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courts held that state law tort claims challenging pesticide 
product labels were preempted by FIFRA,137 although there 
was a split among the courts over whether claims related to 
product efficacy, non-label-related consumer fraud, and 
voluntary label statements (as opposed to those required by 
FIFRA) were preempted.138 
 
                                                          
 137. See, e.g., Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003), 
vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005); Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Olin 
Corp., 313 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2002); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc. 284 F.3d 
895 (8th Cir. 2002); Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244 (3rd Cir. 
1999); Kuiper v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997); Grenier v. 
Vt. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1996); Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 
54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 
1995); Papas v.  Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & 
Gulf P’ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992), 
vacated by Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P’ship v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 U.S. 910 
(1992), adhered to by 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993); Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag 
Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671 
(Ga. 1994); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 948 P.2d 1055 (Haw. 
1997); Wright v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 599 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 1999); Jenkins v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 886 P.2d 869 (Kan. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 820 
(1995); Hopkins v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 666 So. 2d 615 (La. 1996); Hochberg v. 
Zoecon Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1995); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 
800 (Minn. 2000); Eyl v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 650 N.W.2d 744 (Neb. 2002); 
Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992); Lewis v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1998); Eide v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 542 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1996); Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819 
(Tex. 1995); Goodwin v. Bacon, 896 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1995). 
 138. Compare Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 331-32 (5th 
Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding FIFRA does 
preempt claims for crop damage because even though EPA has chosen not to 
review product efficacy data, a judgment against the manufacturer would be 
an incentive for it to alter its label to avoid future liability), Nathan Kimmel v. 
DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199, 1204-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding claim for 
intentional interference with business advantage impliedly preempted by 
FIFRA where claim was premised on manufacturer’s change in label so that 
plaintiff’s pesticide bags could no longer be used with the product), and 
Dahlman Farms, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019-21 (D. Minn. 
2002) (same), with Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri. Prods., 948 P.2d 
1055, 1078-80 (Haw. 1997) (finding no FIFRA preemption for voluntary label 
statements), Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 948 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Idaho 1997) 
(same), Peterson v. BASF Corp., 675 N.W.2d 57, 70-71 (Minn. 2004), vacated, 
125 S. Ct. 1968 (2005) (holding FIFRA did not preempt consumer fraud claim 
based on allegations that manufacturer’s marketing of herbicides misled 
farmers into believing that another cheaper herbicide by same manufacturer 
could not be used on their crops), and American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, 79 
S.W.3d 21, 24-25 (Tex. 2002) (holding FIFRA does not preempt state law 
claims for crop damage because EPA has chosen not to regulate product 
effectiveness). 
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c. A Renewed Judicial Role: Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC 
In April 2005, the Supreme Court decided Bates, a case in 
which herbicide manufacturers sought a declaratory judgment 
against Texas peanut farmers who were threatening to sue for 
crop damage caused by the herbicide “Strongarm.”139  The 
plaintiffs brought counterclaims including negligence, strict 
liability, breach of warranties, and fraud.140  The District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas found the plaintiffs’ state law 
claims were preempted by FIFRA, and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals agreed.141  In finding the plaintiffs’ claims 
preempted, the court of appeals held that even when EPA has 
not imposed a labeling requirement,142 for a state to authorize 
recovery under any of the state law claims would clearly impose 
a requirement “in addition to or different from” those required 
under FIFRA, in part because it might cause the manufacturer 
to seek a change in the label language.143 
The Supreme Court disagreed.144  The decision, authored 
by Justice Stevens, soundly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s broad 
view of FIFRA preemption.  The Court began by stating clearly 
that nothing in FIFRA itself “would prevent a State from 
making the violation of a federal labeling or packaging 
requirement a state offense, thereby imposing its own sanctions 
on pesticide manufacturers who violate federal law.”145  The 
Court acknowledged that under Cipollone, the term 
“requirements” in section 136v(b) of FIFRA reaches beyond 
positive enactments, such as statutes or regulations, to 
embrace judge-made rules or jury verdicts, but it is crucial to 
determine the scope of that preemption.146  Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit was “quite wrong when it assumed that any event, such 
as a jury verdict, that might ‘induce’ a pesticide manufacturer 
to change its label should be viewed as a requirement.”147  
                                                          
 139. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1793 (2005). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Plaintiffs had argued that their common law claims were not related 
to the pesticide label because the claims were based on the pesticide’s efficacy, 
which EPA has expressly declined review in the registration process.  See id. 
at 1796. 
 143. Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2003), 
vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
 144. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1804 (vacating and remanding the case). 
 145. Id. at 1797. 
 146. See id. at 1798. 
 147. Id. 
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According to the Court, in order for a “requirement” to be 
preempted it must be a requirement for “labeling or packaging” 
and must be “in addition to or different from” those required 
under FIFRA.148 
In reviewing the plaintiffs’ state law claims, the Court held 
that the common law claims for defective design, defective 
manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty 
were not requirements for “labeling or packaging” and thus, 
were not preempted.149  Even if a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs on such claims might induce the manufacturer to 
alter its label, the Court rejected such an “effects-based” test, 
choosing instead to focus on whether the elements of the 
common law claim imposed labeling or packaging requirements 
more burdensome than federal law.150  Indeed, the Court stated 
that the threat of damages may give manufacturers an 
additional reason to comply with federal requirements, and 
private remedies to enforce federal misbranding requirements 
“would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of 
FIFRA.”151  The Court made clear that although FIFRA does 
not provide a federal remedy to those injured by manufacturers’ 
violations of FIFRA’s requirements, “nothing in [section] 
136v(b) precludes States from providing such a remedy.”152 
The Court also looked to the “long history of tort litigation 
against manufacturers of poisonous substances” to 
“emphasize[] the importance of providing an incentive to 
manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of 
distributing inherently dangerous items.”153  The Court noted 
with approval that common law tort suits could spur 
                                                          
 148. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1799.  For instance, if state law claims for 
fraud and failure to warn are equivalent to FIFRA’s requirements that a 
pesticide label not contain “false or misleading” statements, 7 U.S.C. § 
136(q)(1)(A) (2000), or inadequate instructions or warnings, 7 U.S.C. § 
136(q)(1)(F), (G), such claims would not be preempted.  See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 
1800. 
 151. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1800-02.  The Court noted that the United States’ 
argument in favor of broad preemption in this case was “particularly dubious 
given that just five years ago the United States advocated the interpretation 
that we adopt today.”  Id. at 1801 & n.24 (citations omitted). 
 152. Id. at 1801; see id. at 1800 (relying upon its earlier decision in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), for the conclusion that state law 
tort claims that imposed “parallel requirements” to FIFRA’s labeling 
provisions were not preempted). 
 153. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801-02. 
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manufacturers to “gain more information about their products’ 
performance in diverse settings.”154  The Court concluded by 
confirming that FIFRA did preempt competing state labeling 
standards as well as “any statutory or common-law rule that 
would impose a labeling requirement that diverges from those 
set out in FIFRA and its implementing regulations.”155 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bates thus expressly 
permits state legislatures and courts to create statutory and 
common law damage remedies for violations of federal labeling 
requirements or violations of state law requirements unrelated 
to labeling.  The decision has significant implications for 
plaintiffs seeking to recover against pesticide manufacturers 
for failure to conduct adequate testing or for defective design of 
pesticides leading to the injury of children.  While these claims 
once would have been contained under the umbrella of 
“labeling” claims preempted by FIFRA, they can now stand on 
their own and provide incentives for manufacturers to conduct 
appropriate testing for children’s health impacts or face the 
alternative of potential damage awards at trial. 
IV. THE COMMON LAW AND A CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
AGENDA 
Up until now, the children’s health agenda with regard to 
pesticides has been played out mainly on the legislative and 
regulatory front.  Lawsuits were generally limited to those 
against agencies to impact policy changes, as previously 
discussed.  Continued pursuit of policy improvements through 
those channels remains crucial.  However, developments in 
FIFRA preemption and the common law as a result of Bates 
makes common law tort claims against manufacturers a more 
promising approach today than it was prior to the Court’s 
decision. 
Since Bates, there is little question that most negligent 
testing and negligent design claims are not subject to FIFRA 
preemption, as most of these claims are unrelated to the 
pesticide label.  Thus, this Section proposes a framework for 
pursuing negligent testing and negligent design claims specific 
to children’s health issues.  Moreover, this Section argues that 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 1802; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense 
Council, et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 124, at 9 (quoting Letter 
from Lynn R. Goldman, Assistant Administrator of Environmental Protection 
Agency for Pesticides and Toxic Substances (Jan. 7, 1994)). 
 155. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1803.   
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courts should recognize the precautionary principle embedded 
in the FQPA and use it to exercise their discretion under 
Daubert, allowing such cases to reach a jury.  The burden of 
proof should then be shifted to defendant manufacturers where 
the lack of “ideal” data can be attributed to the defendant. 
A. DEFECTIVE DESIGN AND NEGLIGENT TESTING CLAIMS 
Even before the Bates decision, the majority of state and 
federal courts around the country had held that unlike claims 
for failure to warn or breach of warranty that were based on 
alleged deficiencies in the pesticide label, claims for negligent 
design or negligent testing not based on label defects were free 
from FIFRA preemption.156  Although some other courts held 
that if such a claim might have the “effect” of causing the 
manufacturer to change the label, thereby preempting the 
claim, such reliance on an “effects-based” test for preemption 
appears to have been overruled by Bates.157 
While each state formulates the cause of action slightly 
differently, claims for defective design generally allege that 
                                                          
 156. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., No. 98-35088, 2000 WL 
1763212, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2000); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 
520 (11th Cir. 1993); Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1306 (4th 
Cir. 1992); Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621-25 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2001); Lyall v. Leslie’s Poolmart, 984 F. Supp. 587, 595 (E.D. Mich. 
1997); Reutzel v. Spartan Chem. Co., 903 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-82 (N.D. Iowa 
1995); Helms v. Sporicidin Int’l., 871 F. Supp. 837, 842-44 (E.D.N.C. 1994); 
Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F. Supp. 751, 757-60 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Burke v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Kennan v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 811-12 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Arnold v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 740-41 (Ct. App. 2001); Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215-16  (Iowa 1998); Eide v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 542 N.W.2d 769, 772 (S.D. 1996); All-Pure Chem. Co. v. White, 896 P.2d 
697, 702 (Wash. 1995). 
 157. See, e.g., Hardin v. BASF Corp., 397 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(holding defective design claim preempted as an indirect challenge to EPA-
approved pesticide label); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895, 900 
(8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the question to ask is “whether in seeking to avoid 
liability for any error, would the manufacturer choose to alter the label or 
product” (citing Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747-48 (4th Cir. 
1993))); Akee v. Dow Chem. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1131-32 (D. Haw. 2003) 
(holding negligent testing and negligent design claims preempted as implied 
attacks on the pesticide label).  But see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. 
Ct. 1788, 1799 (2005) (rejecting “effects-based test” as having no support in 
FIFRA which speaks only of “requirements” (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000))); 
Wuebker v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 418 F.3d 883, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding, 
post-Bates, that FIFRA does not preempt plaintiff’s defective design claims 
because legal rules underlying those claims do not require the defendant to 
label or package the product in any particular way). 
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either the product failed to perform safely when used in its 
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or the defendant 
manufactured the pesticide knowing of the adverse health 
impacts.158  Such claims are often coupled with claims for 
negligent testing alleging that the manufacturer failed to 
conduct appropriate testing in designing the product.159 
In these cases, the remedy sought is not a change in the 
label that would warn future users of the potential harms of 
the product but a change in the design of the product itself.  
Some jurisdictions allow at least two ways to establish a claim 
for defective design—the consumer expectation test and the 
risk-utility test.160  Under the consumer expectation test, the 
fact-finder considers whether the product was unsafe to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer.  Because consumer expectations rest in 
part on the product label, some courts held that defective 
design claims based on the consumer expectation test are 
preempted.161 
                                                          
 158. See Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2001) (articulating plaintiff’s design defect claim as being based on the fact 
that even if pesticide was properly labeled in conformity with FIFRA, some 
humans are particularly, but unknowingly, susceptible to harmful effects of 
exposure to Dursban); Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 736 
(Ct. App. 2001) (setting out design defect claim under California law); 
Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215-16 (Iowa 1998) 
(articulating that plaintiff’s defective design claim based on allegations that 
proper design would have caused defendant to alter the product, not change 
the label). 
 159. See, e.g., Bates, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1798 (2005) (discussing defective 
design and negligent testing cases together). 
 160. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 798-800 
(Wash. 2000) (setting out elements of both consumer expectation test and risk-
utility test for defective design claims under Washington law).  But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 & cmt. G (1998) 
(stating that under Restatement, consumer expectations do not constitute an 
independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs); DAVID 
G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8:3 (3rd ed. 2000) (“Although most modern courts have 
abandoned consumer expectations as the basic test of design defectiveness . . . 
some courts occasionally still use this test in certain cases, and the test is 
legislatively prescribed in a small number of states.” (citations omitted)). 
 161. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., No. 98-35088, 2000 WL 
1763212, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2000) (finding Washington’s consumer 
expectation test preempted by FIFRA); Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co., 976 F. Supp. 
393, 399 (W.D. Va. 1997) (holding defective design claim for alleged injuries 
from Dursban based on consumer expectation test preempted by FIFRA).  But 
see Arnold, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742-45 (holding consumer expectation testing 
not preempted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra 
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However, there is authority based on the risk-utility test 
and other more general formulations of a defective design claim 
that can support such claims with regard to pesticides and 
children.  Generally, a product is defective under the risk-
utility test if the likelihood and seriousness of the plaintiff’s 
harm outweighs the burden on the manufacturer to design a 
product that would have prevented those harms and the 
alternative design is both practical and feasible.162 
For instance, in Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chemical Corp.,163 
apple farm workers sued the manufacturer of the pesticide 
Phosdrin, which was used to control aphid infestations on 
orchards, when they sustained toxic reactions after applying 
the pesticide.164  The Washington Supreme Court accepted 
certification of a question of state law from the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals regarding whether a plaintiff may rely upon 
an alternative product for purposes of a risk-utility test applied 
under Washington law.165  The supreme court answered in the 
affirmative, holding that the plaintiff could establish Phosdrin 
was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous based on 
the availability of other pesticides, not simply the availability of 
alternate formulations (designs) for the pesticide at issue.166 
In so holding, the court stated that the plaintiff was 
allowed to establish that safer pesticides could serve the same 
purpose as the pesticide at issue, thus tending to show that 
Phosdrin was defectively designed.167  Although the defendant 
argued such alternatives were not reasonable because a 
competitor had both owned the patent and allowed its EPA 
registration to lapse, the court held that this did not mean the 
defendant “was free to introduce an alternative means of killing 
aphids with indifference to its greater risk of harming 
                                                          
note 160. 
 162. See Ruiz-Guzman, 7 P.3d at 798 (applying Washington law); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 160, § 2(b) 
(noting that a product “is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of 
harm . . . could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe”). 
 163. 7 P.3d 795 (Wash. 2000). 
 164. See id. at 797.  Within a year after the plaintiffs sustained their 
injuries, the State of Washington temporarily suspended the use of Phosdrin, 
and the manufacturer requested that EPA cancel the registration.  The 
pesticide can no longer be used in the United States.  See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 801. 
 167. See id. at 800. 
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humans.”168  Moreover, the plaintiff was not obligated to prove 
that the safer elements of the alternative product could be 
incorporated into the defendant’s product, but only that other, 
safer products were in fact reasonably available.169 
Similarly, in a recent case from the District Court for the 
Southern District of Alabama, the court held that a defective 
design claim could proceed to trial when the plaintiff died after 
allegedly inhaling toxic fumes from a floor cleaner containing 
sulfuric and hydrochloric acid that she was using at home.170 In 
analyzing the defective design claim, the court held the 
plaintiff could prove that a safer, practical, alternative design 
was available to the manufacturer when it manufactured the 
product.171  In finding sufficient evidence for trial, the court 
referred to testimony by both parties’ experts that the sulfuric 
and hydrochloric acids in the product rendered the product 
hazardous and that the product was unique among household 
rust removers in containing those substances.172  Although the 
court noted that exploration of the evidence would be necessary 
at trial to determine whether the plaintiff could meet her 
burden of proof, the evidence was sufficient to overcome the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion.173 
To the extent certain products pose more risks to children 
than others, the risk-utility theory supports using the less 
harmful products as evidence that the more harmful products 
are defectively designed.  For instance, numerous pesticides 
including dieldrin, aminocarb, captan, carbaryl, lindane, 
malathion, and dichlorophos can induce changes in the immune 
and nervous systems, particularly those of infants and 
children.174  To the extent other pesticide products that are not 
immunotoxic or neurotoxic are reasonably available to control 
target pests, such availability can be used to support the risk-
utility theory for a defective design claim. 
In other defective design cases, courts have focused less on 
                                                          
 168. Id. 
 169. See Ruiz-Guzman, 7 P.3d at 798. 
 170. See Gougler v. Sirius Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 (S.D. 
Ala. 2005). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See NRDC Comments, supra note 33, at 8 (citing WORLD HEATH ORG., 
WHO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY 
PRESENT CHILDREN’S HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 
(Apr. 2002)). 
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the specific elements of the defective design claims and more on 
the relationship between FIFRA and state tort law.  For 
instance, in Burke v. Dow Chemical Co.,175 the plaintiff alleged 
that her twin children were born severely brain damaged after 
she was exposed to Dursban when her home was sprayed to 
exterminate insects.176  In denying the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s tort claims,177 the  District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York began its analysis 
by noting that protection of the public against toxic substances 
has traditionally been a matter left to the states.178  Those 
states, moreover, have developed rules to compensate for 
injuries and “help deter injurious behavior in a complex 
industrial environment,” where technology exceeds the average 
person’s ability to protect against dangers.179  The court 
contrasted this state system with federal legislation, which 
does not have a comprehensive program to compensate persons 
injured by hazardous products, and federal agencies, which 
neither arrange for their own testing of products nor “put their 
seal of approval” on products.180  As a result, consumers must 
“still look to the great font of state tort law for protection 
against harmful toxic substances.”181 
In analyzing the plaintiff’s claims under the risk-utility 
test for defective design, the court rejected the argument that 
compliance with federal standards immunizes a manufacturer 
from state tort liability.  Simply because the EPA determines a 
pesticide “will perform its intended function without 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” does not 
“supplant the state’s power to render a judgment as to the 
relative risks and benefits of the product.”182  Moreover, the 
court noted that with regard to testing, it is the applicants who 
submit scientific data and draft product labels, and EPA does 
not attempt to independently verify the test data provided.183  
As a result, “EPA oversight will not be nearly as protective of 
                                                          
 175. 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 176. See id. at 1131. 
 177. See id. at 1134. 
 178. See id. at 1131-32. 
 179. Id. at 1132. 
 180. See id. at 1132. 
 181. Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1132. 
 182. Id. at 1142 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)). 
 183. See Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1132. 
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persons exposed to pesticides as state tort law.”184 
Similarly, in Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co.,185 the California 
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s defective design claim 
was not preempted because it was based on the argument that 
Dursban should not have been used in the plaintiff’s home 
because it was unreasonably dangerous, its harms outweighed 
the benefits, and the plaintiff’s birth defects could have been 
prevented if Dursban had not been used.186  The court also 
rejected the argument that simply because EPA registers the 
pesticide at issue, the manufacturer can avoid a determination 
that it is defectively designed under state law.187 
Finally, in 1998 the Iowa Supreme Court held that claims 
for negligent testing against a herbicide manufacturer for 
alleged crop loss could go forward based on testimony from the 
plaintiff’s expert that numerous studies were available to the 
pesticide manufacturer showing the pesticide was not 
adequately degradable in certain weather conditions.188  
However, the manufacturer allegedly rushed the product onto 
the market without sufficient testing so that farmers would 
purchase its product instead of that of its competitors.189  In 
reaching its holding, the court rejected the manufacturer’s 
argument that the plaintiff should “lose his claim on the merits 
because testing is so closely superintended by EPA.”190  
Instead, the court held that such cases should only be 
dismissed on a showing that the agency in fact “supplanted the 
manufacturer in matters of design and testing.”191 
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals articulated these 
same principles—that state tort law retains an important role 
despite the federal regulation of pesticides—in the Ferebee case 
decided in 1984,192 which the Bates opinion cited with 
approval.193  In Ferebee, the court of appeals affirmed a verdict 
for the plaintiff on his claim that long-term exposure to the 
                                                          
 184. Id. at 1135. 
 185. 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 186. See id. at 738. 
 187. See id. at 746. 
 188. See Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 
1998). 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id. at 216. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 193. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005). 
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pesticide paraquat led to his contracting pulmonary fibrosis, 
and Chevron had failed to warn him of the dangers.194  The 
court focused both on Chevron’s knowledge of the dangers of 
paraquat at the time the plaintiff used the product and the 
relationship between state tort law and FIFRA.195  With regard 
to Chevron’s knowledge, the court found it highly relevant that 
Chevron had known the pesticide could cause the type of lung 
disease the plaintiff suffered and that the pesticide selectively 
attacks the lungs when it enters the body.196  The court also 
focused on the reports and data in Chevron’s files regarding 
other incidents of paraquat exposure and held that such 
knowledge imparted a legal duty.197 
As for the relationship between state tort law and FIFRA, 
the court rejected the argument that EPA’s registration of 
paraquat constituted an expert, federal determination that the 
product did not pose an unreasonable risk to the normal 
user.198  Instead, the court recognized that the purpose of 
FIFRA is to ensure that, from a cost-benefit point of view, 
paraquat as labeled does not produce “unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment” while state tort law “may have 
broader, compensatory goals.”199  Indeed, EPA was required to 
assign a “cost value” to the pesticide’s risks and estimate the 
benefits at large to society, but there is no need for a court or a 
jury to “strike the same balance on these difficult questions as 
EPA.”200  The court went on to note that assignment “of values 
to such ‘soft’ variables as human health is among the most 
difficult tasks faced in a regulatory society.”201 
Finally, the court stated that tort recovery may also 
encourage plaintiffs to bring suits for injuries “not previously 
recognized as traceable” to the pesticide at issue which may 
“aid in the exposure of new dangers associated with 
pesticides.”202  Successful lawsuits of this kind may lead 
manufacturers to change their labeling or registration with 
EPA or cause EPA itself to require changes.  Moreover, the 
                                                          
 194. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532. 
 195. See id. at 1536, 1539. 
 196. See id. at 1536-38. 
 197. See id. at 1537. 
 198. See id. at 1540. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1541. 
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threat of damages actions may provide manufacturers with 
added “dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of all 
possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to 
forestall such actions through product improvement.”203  It was 
this language in the Ferebee case that the Supreme Court cited 
with approval in Bates.204 
Although Ferebee was rarely cited, except with disapproval, 
between the 1992 Cipollone decision and the 2005 Bates 
decision,205 the Supreme Court’s positive reference to the case 
bodes well for efforts to utilize state tort actions, particularly 
defective design and negligent testing claims.  Such claims, 
which will very seldom be subject to FIFRA preemption, can be 
used to pursue relief on behalf of children injured by pesticides 
and play a role in prompting manufacturers to engage in 
additional testing to defend against liability or remove those 
products from the market.  Indeed, in Bates, the Supreme 
Court had little difficulty holding that rules requiring 
manufacturers to use due care in both conducting appropriate 
testing of their products and designing products in a reasonably 
safe manner are not subject to preemption and can provide 
incentives for better testing and products.206 
B. USING BATES AND THE FQPA TO PROMOTE CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH IN THE COURTS BY SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
While the obstacle of FIFRA preemption has certainly 
lessened in the wake of Bates, the scientific evidence barriers 
remain, and plaintiffs still need to get past Daubert motions to 
obtain compensation and help shape corporate behavior in the 
future.  Thus, one remaining question is how scientists and 
nonprofit groups, who have previously focused their efforts on 
encouraging EPA to set more protective standards, can now 
turn some of those efforts to tort law to help impose those 
standards through the courts. 
First, significant evidence has been gathered since the 
1993 NAS study showing the risk pesticides pose to children. 
Some of this evidence is general, and other evidence is more 
specific—either to disease outcomes or to chemicals. For 
                                                          
 203. Id. at 1541-42. 
 204. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005). 
 205. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th  Cir. 1994); 
DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Ark. 1993). 
 206. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1798, 1802. 
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instance, researchers have linked environmental toxicant 
exposure to higher rates of low birth weight, intellectual 
impairment, and behavioral problems,207 but EPA currently 
does not require “development neurotoxicity testing” using even 
animal experiments to provide information on how a particular 
chemical impacts the fetal and newborn nervous system.208  In 
its most recent proposed regulations setting data requirements 
for pesticide registration, EPA included tests for developmental 
neurotoxicity (DNT).  Such tests are not a “core” requirement 
but only a “conditional requirement” if other tests (which 
generally are less sensitive) show indications that the pesticide 
may result in development neurotoxicity.209  Because EPA does 
not require this testing in connection with pesticide and other 
chemical registration, the most basic toxicity tests in animals 
are lacking for seventy-five percent of the 3,000 highest 
production chemicals, despite the fact that EPA acknowledges 
that over 140 registered pesticides are neurotoxic.210 
At the same time, the European Union is proposing a much 
stricter regulatory framework for industrial chemicals.  Under 
the proposal, both European and non-European manufacturers 
doing business in Europe would be required to submit 
extensive toxicity data for tens of thousands of chemicals on the 
market.211  That such testing protocols are currently available 
and such data will soon exist in regulatory systems outside the 
United States can be used to support both negligent testing 
claims and defective design claims on grounds that such testing 
is reasonably available and would likely result in safer 
chemicals being designed and used in the United States.212  
                                                          
 207. See Lanphear, supra note 1, at 203. 
 208. See id. at 205; see also SCHETTLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 108-12 
(discussing lack of toxicity data for registered chemicals and noting that “[i]t is 
not that there is a lack of accepted methods for testing developmental 
neurotoxicity”); WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 61 (discussing a developmental 
neurotoxicity study and stating that even though the study was extensively 
validated years ago, EPA has received data from development neurotoxicity 
testing for only six pesticides, with no such data on the many pesticides in use 
already known to be toxic to the nervous system). 
 209. See, e.g., Pesticides: Data Requirement for Conventional Chemicals, 
70 Fed. Reg. 12,276, 12,343-45 (Mar. 11, 2005) (showing DNT as conditionally 
required and setting forth those conditions); Learning Disabilities Ass’n of 
America, Comments Re: 40 CFR Parts 152 and 158 at 3-6, 
http://www.epa.gov/edocket (Docket ID No. OPP-2004-0387). 
 210. See Lanphear, supra note 1, at 204. 
 211. See REACH, supra note 36. 
 212. See WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 61-62 (discussing the fact that the 
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Indeed, while EPA may or may not choose to regulate based on 
data collected in European countries, there is no reason such 
evidence would not be admissible in litigation. 
Moreover, there is a growing call among academics, 
scientists, and policymakers that Daubert and our current tort 
system generally is contributing to an “environmental and 
human health crisis.”213  Some have proposed that the burden 
of proof in toxic tort cases be modified where chemicals, 
including pesticides, are released into the environment and the 
manufacturer has failed to conduct the type of studies that 
would help prove or disprove a causal link between the 
chemical and physical harm.214  In those circumstances, it 
would be the defendant manufacturer, not the plaintiff, who 
would bear the burden of scientific uncertainty.215  In other 
words, “proof of a failure to discover and disseminate adequate 
health information about a substance stands in for proof of 
causation of harm.”216  Thus, once the plaintiff makes a prima 
facie showing that the defendant released an inadequately 
investigated chemical into the environment and the plaintiff 
was exposed to that chemical, the defendant could avoid 
liability by disproving general causation or showing the 
plaintiff’s illness was caused by other factors.217 
While such proposals may be appealing to those who are 
                                                          
developmental neurotoxicity study protocol to assess the effects of pesticides 
on the developing brain and nervous system has been extensively validated for 
years, but EPA still does not require developmental neurotoxicity data for 
most pesticides, even those already known to be toxic to the nervous system). 
 213. See, e.g., Lynda M. Collins, Strange Bedfellows?  The Precautionary 
Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort Paradigm for the 21st Century, 35 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,361, 10,361-62 (2005); see also JOE THORNTON, PANDORA’S POISON: 
CHLORINE, HEALTH, AND A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 117-20 (2000); 
George P. Lakoff, A Cognitive Scientist Looks at Daubert, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH S114, S116-S117 (Supp. 1 2005) (arguing that Daubert and Joiner 
allow the judge, not the jury, to decide the case, discourage scientists from 
testifying at trial, and remove inherent fairness in the trial process). 
 214. See Collins, supra note 213, at 10,370. 
 215. See id.; see also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:  
Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
2117, 2133-34, 2143 (1997) (proposing to eliminate the general causation 
requirement in toxic tort cases and imposing liability on defendants for failure 
to provide substantial information relating to risk); Lynda Collins, Material 
Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 
105, 140 (2001); James M. Olson, Shifting the Burden of Proof: How the 
Common Law Can Safeguard Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic, 20 ENVTL. 
L. 891 (1990). 
 216. Collins, supra note 213, at 10,370. 
 217. See id. 
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frustrated with the inability of plaintiffs to prevail in many 
meritorious cases, they also are a significant departure from 
current tort law doctrine without any statutory or common law 
basis to support such a radical shift.  Some may also criticize 
the fairly low burden placed on the plaintiff (mere exposure) to 
qualify for entitlement to shift the burden of proof. 
Although these are obviously difficult issues, they seem 
somewhat less difficult in the context of pesticides and 
children’s health because of the statutory support in the FQPA 
and because pesticide manufacturers are in the best position to 
provide the necessary scientific data.218  Although FIFRA 
provides for a cost-benefit analysis in registering pesticides, the 
FQPA imposes an overlay of the precautionary principle when 
it comes to children’s health impacts, as earlier discussed.  
While one may argue this should only apply to the tolerance 
standards EPA sets for individual pesticides, there is a good 
argument that the statute itself sets a different policy direction 
for scientific uncertainty when it comes to children’s health in 
general.  The statute, along with basic principles of fairness, 
provide ample room to consider some measure of burden-
shifting in at least this narrow category of cases, allowing 
judges to err on the side of letting cases involving children’s 
health go to the jury in the absence of “perfect” data 
establishing causation. 
The task, then, is to create a judicial framework for state 
common law tort claims in which courts can evaluate not only 
the available scientific evidence but also any limitations on 
that evidence, such as the ethical concerns regarding testing on 
humans discussed earlier. The court could also evaluate the 
defendant’s failure to undertake reasonable and available 
testing.  Once the defendant’s failure to undertake reasonable 
testing becomes relevant in response to a Daubert challenge, as 
well as causation in general, courts will become better educated 
with regard to evaluating the benefits and shortcomings of 
different types of scientific evidence (such as epidemiological 
versus various animal studies).  Moreover, this inquiry has the 
potential to place significant incentives on pesticide 
manufacturers to conduct any testing identified by plaintiffs to 
avoid any burden-shifting in the case. 
Courts could thus implement the following framework.  
The plaintiff would establish at a pretrial hearing initiated by 
                                                          
 218. See id. 
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the plaintiff or in response to a Daubert challenge that testing 
protocols are available or could reasonably be developed to test 
for the harm suffered by the plaintiff, but the defendant has 
neither conducted such testing nor shown similar data through 
other testing mechanisms that already exist.  At that point, the 
plaintiff, through the introduction of expert testimony on the 
negligent testing issue, will have satisfied his burden under 
Daubert, or the applicable state standard, and the court would 
then shift the burden of proof on causation to the defendant at 
trial.  In other words, the plaintiff would be entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption that the defendant’s failure to conduct 
the testing was negligent, and that the testing would have 
resulted in data not already available that would cause a 
reasonable manufacturer to take the pesticide off the market or 
use a less harmful design that would not have caused the 
plaintiff’s injury. 
The process proposed here is not as sweeping or as 
comprehensive as the burden-shifting proposals previously 
discussed with regard to hazardous chemicals in general.  
However, the proposal outlined here has several benefits.  
First, it draws upon some statutory support, the FQPA, where 
the precautionary principle is strong.  Second, it is within a 
process similar to a Daubert hearing, with which courts and 
litigants are already familiar.  Third, it is a much less radical 
departure from current tort law jurisprudence because 
uncertainty alone is not enough to shift the burden of proof.  
Instead, the plaintiff must point to specific testing or data 
collection for evidence not already available through other 
means that the manufacturer could have conducted to shift the 
burden of proof.  While this proposal is certainly a smaller step 
and would apply in a much narrower category of cases, it is a 
step that may be easier for courts to actually implement within 
our current jurisprudential framework. 
Such a framework would encourage pesticide 
manufacturers to engage in reasonably available testing not 
already required by EPA in order to meet its burden to disprove 
causation.  This would place the burden of collecting scientific 
data regarding the pesticide on the party in the best position to 
bear it.  When one considers that it is the defendant 
manufacturer who has introduced the pesticide into the stream 
of commerce and is collecting the profits, such a framework 
does not seem unreasonable.  Doing so would allow the tort 
system to work as the Supreme Court promised in Bates—to 
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put additional pressure on manufacturers to investigate and 
improve their products or be subject to potential liability in the 
face of scientific uncertainty they are in the best position to 
remedy.219 
C. THE PROMISE OF BURDEN-SHIFTING: PROPOSITION 65 AND 
CERCLA 
California Proposition 65, or the Safe Drinking Water and 
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986,220 illustrates that shifting the 
burden of proof in civil liability cases can create sufficient 
incentives for manufacturers to collect and make available 
valuable data on environmental health risks and causation. 
The law is most well-known for the requirement that 
businesses give “clear and reasonable warning” to anyone they 
expose to chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive 
toxicity.221  Such warnings must be attached to the product 
itself, prominently displayed where the product is sold or used, 
or conveyed to the public in other ways through notices in the 
public news media, provided the warning is “clear and 
reasonable.”222 
Businesses have had great difficulty complying with the 
warning requirements for environmental exposures, because 
they are forced to determine the affected area of emissions as 
well as the appropriate method of warning under the 
circumstances for all chemicals subject to the law.223  Penalties 
                                                          
 219. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1801-02 (2005). 
 220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (2004).  California voters 
adopted the law by ballot initiative in 1986.  See Michael Barsa, Note, 
California’s Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 1223, 1223-24 (1997). 
 221. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6; see also Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2005); Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: 
Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303 
(1996); Barsa, supra note 220, at 1227-35. 
 222. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.6, 25249.11(f); see also 
Ingredient Commc’ns Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th. 1480, 1495-96 
(Ct. App. 1992) (holding toll-free telephone information system does not per se 
satisfy the warning requirement for use of chemicals covered by the law). 
 223. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601 (2002); see also Consumer Cause, 
Inc. v. Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 644-45 (Ct. App. 2001) (reversing 
summary judgment for defendant in case where defendant dental care 
providers were alleged to have violated Proposition 65 for failing to warn of 
mercury contained in “silver filling” dental amalgam because providers had 
not contended that they had performed a qualitative risk assessment, as was 
their burden, to establish the numeric level for “no observable reproductive 
KLASS_FINAL_120.DOCNAL 01/09/2006  12:41:34 PM 
138 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:1 
 
for providing an insufficient warning, which is an issue of fact 
for the jury, are up to $2,500 per day, and private citizens as 
well as the government may initiate a suit for an alleged 
violation.224 
The law’s relevance to this Article is the exemption it 
provides to businesses to avoid these indeterminate warning 
requirements.  The law states in relevant part that a warning 
is not required for any discharge or release where the 
responsible person can show the exposure poses “no significant 
risk” of cancer, assuming a lifetime exposure at the level in 
question, and the exposure will have “no observable effect” with 
regard to reproductive toxicity, assuming exposure at 1000 
times the level in question.225  Thus, to avoid the potential legal 
liability imposed by the law’s warning requirements, the 
burden is placed on the manufacturer or other business to 
establish based on “evidence and standards of comparable 
scientific validity”226 that the chemical poses no significant risk 
or no observable reproductive effect. 
In order to take advantage of this exception to the warning 
requirement, the law authorizes California’s Office of 
Environmental Health and Hazard Assessment (OEHHA)227 to 
establish numerical exposure thresholds that will constitute 
the statutory “no significant risk” standards.228  However, the 
burden is placed on businesses to provide adequate data to the 
regulators to convince them to set such numerical 
thresholds.229  Thus, the law has “shifted the burden of proof” 
to the business sector to provide sufficient scientific data to 
avoid the threat of liability from a multitude of lawsuits over 
inadequate warnings. 
In doing so, California has given significant incentives to 
the business and manufacturing sector to collect data and 
provide it to regulators in order to set numeric standards as 
quickly as possible for a whole host of chemicals to show that 
their emissions are under the “no risk” levels and thus “safe.”230  
                                                          
effects” from mercury). 
 224. See CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7. 
 225. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, pmbl. (2002). 
 228. See id. at tit. 22, § 12701. 
 229. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (2004) (“In any action 
brought to enforce Section 25249.6, the burden of showing that an exposure 
meets the criteria of this subdivision shall be on the defendant.”). 
 230. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12703 (setting forth Quantitative Risk 
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This is very different from the current framework under federal 
pesticide law and other environmental health and safety laws, 
where the government and private plaintiffs bear the burden of 
collecting data to either set regulatory standards or prove the 
product has caused harm in the context of a lawsuit. 
Under Proposition 65, California has received sufficient 
scientific data to establish nearly 300 numeric standards for 
toxic pollutants without any legal challenge, prompting a 
review panel to state that “by federal standards, Proposition 65 
has resulted in 100 years of progress in the areas of hazard 
identification, risk assessment and exposure assessment.”231  
Thus, California’s system creates uncertainty and legal liability 
for product manufacturers and their customers and then places 
the burden of proof on them to provide the data to set safety 
standards for those products to avoid that uncertainty and 
potential liability. 
Other examples of burden-shifting in the environmental 
law and toxic tort context exist as well.  For instance, even 
though the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)232 does not 
expressly state that it imposes strict, joint, and several liability 
on owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters of hazardous 
substances, courts have interpreted the law to impose such 
liability.233  As a result, once the plaintiff establishes that the 
defendant falls within one of the classes of persons subject to 
potential liability, each defendant bears the burden of 
disproving that its actions resulted in a release of a hazardous 
substance.234  As one court has stated, even though placing the 
burden of proof with regard to causation and divisibility of 
harm may result in many defendants paying more than their 
                                                          
Assessment requirements to determine the level of exposure that constitutes 
“no significant risk” of cancer for a chemical); §§ 12701-12711 (authorizing 
agency adoption of “no significant risk” levels for carcinogens); §§ 12801-12805 
(authorizing agency adoption of acceptable exposure levels for reproductive 
toxicants). 
 231. Barsa, supra note 220, at 1240; see also Clifford Rechtschaffen, How to 
Reduce Lead Exposures with One Simple Statute: The Experience of 
Proposition 65, 29 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,581, 10,581 (1999) 
(stating that Proposition 65 “has spurred faster and more significant lead 
reductions than federal law by prompting companies to reformulate products 
and change their manufacturing processes”). 
 232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
 233. See PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 257-58 (4th ed. 2003). 
 234. See id. at 258. 
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fair share, “Congress intended for those proven at least 
partially culpable to bear the cost of the uncertainty.”235 
D. EXAMPLES OF COMMON LAW BURDEN-SHIFTING 
While the examples above show how statutory burden-
shifting can create real incentives for chemical manufacturers 
and others to produce valuable data, some may question 
whether it is appropriate for courts to shift the burden of proof 
to create such incentives as a matter of common law.  However, 
a review of the case law reveals that courts have relied on the 
common law to shift the burden of proof to promote important 
policy goals, even in the absence of a statutory mandate like 
that found in Proposition 65. 
For instance, in the tort law context, the landmark cases of 
Summers v. Tice236 and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories237 show 
courts using their authority under the common law to place the 
burden of proof on the party best able to bear it.  In Summers, 
the plaintiff sought recovery for an eye injury from two 
hunters, both of whom were hunting and only one of whom hit 
the plaintiff with a shot.238  The trial court held that both 
defendants were liable for negligence, and that the plaintiff 
was not contributorily negligent.239  On appeal, the defendants 
argued that because they were not acting in concert, they were 
not joint tortfeasors and could not be held jointly and severally 
liable.240  In rejecting this argument, the California Supreme 
Court held that ordinarily “defendants are in a far better 
position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the 
injury,” and principles of “policy and justice” supported shifting 
the burden of proof on both causation and allocation of damages 
to the defendants.241  The court further reasoned that if 
determining causation and proper apportionment of damages 
was difficult or incapable of proof, “the innocent wronged party 
should not be deprived of his right to redress,” and “the 
wrongdoers are not in a position to complain of uncertainty.”242 
                                                          
 235. O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 236. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
 237. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
 238. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 1-2. 
 239. See id. at 2. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. at 4-5. 
 242. Id. at 5; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) 
(adopting rule from Summers). 
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In Sindell, the named plaintiff in a class sought damages 
against drug companies seeking to recover for injuries 
sustained as a result of her mother taking the drug 
diethylstilbesterol (DES) during pregnancy.243  The plaintiff 
was able to identify the drug involved but not the manufacturer 
of the precise product ingested.244  On appeal from the 
dismissal of the action, the California Supreme Court began 
with the proposition that generally, imposition of liability 
depends on the plaintiff’s ability to show that an act by the 
defendant caused her injuries.245  The court then noted 
exceptions to this rule, such as the rule of Summers v. Tice, 
market-based liability, and concert of action theories, but 
concluded that none of those theories could help the plaintiff 
because she had not joined all of 200 or more DES 
manufacturers in the lawsuit.246 
However, the court held that despite the absence of an 
existing  theory of recovery for the plaintiff, the court was not 
willing to affirm the lower court’s dismissal, noting that “[i]n 
our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in 
science and technology create fungible goods which may harm 
consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific 
producer.”247  The court went on to proclaim that “[t]he 
response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior 
doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or 
to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.”248  The 
court proceeded to set out a modified theory of market share 
liability that shifted the burden to the defendants to prove that 
they could not have caused the plaintiff’s harm once the 
plaintiff established negligence or strict liability with regard to 
the drug in general.249  This theory was based in part on a 1978 
article in the Fordham Law Review setting forth a framework 
for liability in DES cases.250  Thus, the court concluded that as 
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the 
latter should bear the cost of the injury and that “[f]rom a 
                                                          
 243. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. 
 244. See id. at 926. 
 245. See id. at 928. 
 246. See id. at 930-35. 
 247. Id. at 936. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37. 
 250. See id. at 927, 936-38 (citing Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of 
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978)). 
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broader policy standpoint,” defendants were better able to bear 
the cost of injury resulting from the creation of a defective 
product.251 
Although courts have not universally adopted the rules set 
out in Summers and Sindell,252 these decisions are significant 
as examples of courts using the common law to shift the burden 
of proof when plaintiffs are not at fault for the lack of evidence 
on causation and the defendants are in a better position to bear 
that risk. 
Such use of burden-shifting to develop the common law is 
not limited to the tort arena.  In the famous case of O’Keeffe v. 
Snyder,253 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a 
strict application of the doctrine of adverse possession should 
no longer apply to cases involving recovery of chattels.254  The 
court reasoned that the existing adverse possession rule, which 
placed the burden of proof on the adverse possessor to show her 
possession was hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and 
continuous, was unworkable in the context of personal 
property, which is often kept in a home or other private 
place.255  The facts of this case involved an alleged theft of a 
Georgia O’Keeffe painting that was later transferred to a bona 
fide purchaser.256  In that context, the court found that a 
burden of establishing a continuous public display of a work of 
art to obtain rights of possession after expiration of the statute 
of limitations for replevin would impose too a heavy burden on 
the purchaser, who wished to enjoy the painting in her own 
home.257 
The court thus modified the common law doctrine to place 
                                                          
 251. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936; see also Beshada v. Johns-Manville 
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982) (shifting burden of proof on 
causation to defendant in asbestos litigation case because manufacturer had 
been in a position to conduct additional safety research and had failed to do 
so); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing 
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1817-18 (1989) 
(discussing Beshada case in the context of product liability rules and statutory 
frameworks that can be used to provide incentives to manufacturers to collect 
improved toxicity data on their chemicals and products). 
 252. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 428-32 (2000) (providing 
examples of courts placing strict limits on application of rule in Summers and 
Sindell or rejecting the doctrines altogether). 
 253. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). 
 254. See id. at 872. 
 255. See id. at 871. 
 256. See id. at 865-66. 
 257. See id. at 871. 
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the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show she had taken 
diligent steps to investigate and recover the painting or other 
chattel.258  In altering the doctrine, the court was persuaded 
“that the introduction of equitable considerations through the 
discovery rule provides a more satisfactory response than the 
doctrine of adverse possession.”259  The court was very clear 
that its decision was a departure from prior doctrine and stated 
that the decision “not only changes the requirements for 
acquiring title to personal property . . . but also shifts the 
burden of proof” to the owner, as the one seeking the benefit of 
the discovery rule.260  Thus, the New Jersey court, like the 
California courts in Summers and Sindell, used the common 
law to shape a doctrine that better reflected the realities and 
social policy concerns of the day.261 
There is ample precedent, then, for state common law to 
take on this issue and use principles of burden-shifting to allow 
innocent plaintiffs to obtain compensation and force defendants 
to bear the burden of insufficient data, thereby creating 
incentives to obtain better data.  Moreover, there is no reason 
that state common law courts cannot use the existence of the 
FQPA as an additional reason to support a move in favor of 
shifting the burden of proof as a matter of state common law.  
Indeed, the scholarly literature and Supreme Court decisions 
have historically recognized the use of statutory developments 
to support a shift in the common law.  As the Supreme Court 
has stated, “[i]t has always been the duty of the common-law 
court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations 
and to interweave the new legislative policies with the 
inherited body of common-law principles.”262 
                                                          
 258. See id. at 872. 
 259. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872. 
 260. Id. at 873. 
 261. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
152 (1921) (“If judges have wofully [sic] misinterpreted the mores of their day, 
or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in 
helpless submission, the hands of their successors.”).  “I think that when a 
rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be 
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should 
be less hesitation in . . . full abandonment.”  Id. at 150. 
 262. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); see 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 398-406 (2d 
ed. 1995) (presenting Moragne in the context of discussing statutes as a source 
of policy norms); Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Common Law of Legislation, 23 
IOWA L. REV. 41, 54 (1937) (arguing that courts should “use the statutory 
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Following from this precedent, there is increasing evidence 
that courts do in fact apply principles contained in federal and 
state environmental statutes when developing common law 
principles in the area of environmental law.  For instance, even 
though strict liability has been losing ground among courts in 
favor of negligence theory as a general matter, the trend in 
environmental contamination cases appears to be the 
opposite.263  This is because since the enactment of CERCLA in 
1980, courts have become increasingly more comfortable 
applying strict liability in contamination cases as a result of the 
judicial interpretations of CERCLA described above.  A review 
of the case law shows that these same courts have used 
CERCLA to develop the common law doctrine of strict liability 
and to apply that standard of liability more frequently in 
environmental cases.264  There is an equal ability within the 
common law tort system to place a similar incentive on 
manufacturers to collect and evaluate scientific data. 
For burden-shifting to succeed in the context of a toxic tort 
case, however, nonprofit groups and academics in this area 
must work more closely with plaintiffs’ lawyers to help provide 
the testimony and background on scientific uncertainty in the 
context of the FQPA plaintiffs’ need to pursue their cases.  
Nonprofit organizations and academic institutions are in a 
unique position in that they often have access to scientists who 
can explain to the courts the level of scientific uncertainty in 
this area, the reasons behind it, and the reasonably available 
testing protocols.  Such expertise can benefit the FQPA and 
FIFRA regulatory process along with lawsuits against EPA.  
Scientists can help ensure that courts hear and understand the 
evidence that does exist regarding the impact of pesticides on 
                                                          
development as a guide in determining shifting social policy and shifting 
administrative demands”); see also James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the 
Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 230 (1934) (arguing that 
common law courts should look to the legislative process to “strike a more 
favorable balance between legislative and judicial development of law”).  
Judge Guido Calabresi cites Landis and takes his position one step further, 
arguing that courts should be able to exercise their common law powers over 
statutes by revising them where appropriate or forcing legislatures to act, 
rather than being limited to interpreting existing statutory language or 
invalidating statutes based on constitutional grounds.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, 
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 81-92 (1982). 
 263. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: 
The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental 
Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903 (2004). 
 264. See id. at 942-57. 
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children’s health and the reasons for the lack of certain types of 
data. 
Moreover, while efforts to shape the law in this direction 
can start with children’s claims because of the “hook” of the 
FQPA, any positive developments can be used to potentially 
expand burden-shifting more broadly to encompass a wider 
group of plaintiffs harmed by pesticides or other toxic 
chemicals.  In this way, the law can develop in a manner 
similar to that in Summers and Sindell, in that courts first 
become comfortable with burden-shifting in a narrow category 
of cases (in Summers, a very limited number of potential 
defendants, all of whom are known) and then allow such 
expansion to other types of cases as justified (in Sindell, a 
larger number of defendants, some of whom are unknown). 
While state common law tort law claims are a less direct 
approach than compelling EPA to set appropriate testing and 
design standards, the administrative law and political barriers 
to such efforts suggest that state tort law, which has often been 
ignored in recent decades by the volume of federal 
environmental statutes and regulations, still has an important 
role to play in regulating environmental harms.265  Indeed, the 
tort law system has always been and can continue to be a 
vehicle to force pesticide manufacturers to fully take the costs 
of children’s health into account in analyzing which products to 
place on the market and to conduct the scientific studies 
necessary to ensure their safety.266 
                                                          
 265. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons for Environmental Law from the 
American Codification Debate, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 130, 
154 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (noting that the 
common law is “much superior to statutory law in controlling the role of 
interest groups” and should not be abandoned in efforts to protect the 
environment). 
 266. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc., 370 F.3d 860, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Imposing novel tort theories on economic activity 
significantly affects the risks of engaging in that activity, and thus alters the 
cost and availability of the activity within the forum jurisdiction.”); Berger, 
supra note 215, at 2119 (stating that reforms relating to the plaintiff’s burden 
of proof on causation “furthers tort law’s corrective justice rationale that 
liability is linked to moral responsibility”); Collins, supra note 213, at 10,362 
(“Thus, more than its statutory sibling, tort has the potential to actually 
change the economic equation – making it cheaper to protect than to pollute 
the environment.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A review of the regulatory and legal history of the Food 
Quality Protection Act of 1996 shows that although the law was 
heralded with great expectations, its implementation has not 
yet created a sufficient structure to significantly aid in 
protecting children from harmful pesticide exposure.  Moreover, 
targeted lawsuits against EPA to improve implementation of 
the FQPA’s key provisions have had little success as a result of 
procedural administrative law hurdles.  However, recent 
developments in state law tort actions to recover damages for 
pesticide-related harms, notably the Supreme Court’s 2005 
Bates decision, support the proposition that state law tort 
actions may provide a vehicle to increase protection for 
children’s health. 
In order to accomplish this goal, environmental and 
children’s nonprofit organizations should work more closely 
with plaintiffs’ lawyers representing children in pesticide 
exposure cases to present the best causation data available.  
Moreover, where good data is not available, such groups can 
help courts understand the nature of the scientific uncertainty 
and encourage them to implement the precautionary principle 
inherent in the FQPA.  Plaintiffs can then argue that when 
currently unavailable causation data could be reasonably 
obtained, but the defendant has not conducted the testing to 
obtain such data, the plaintiff has established its burden under 
Daubert and the burden of proof on causation should be shifted 
to the defendant. 
In this way, the tort system can encourage positive 
developments in testing, product availability, and regulation of 
pesticides as they impact children’s health.  This result can be 
realized not only because the fear of lawsuits may spur 
manufacturers to create safer and better products, as Justice 
Stevens noted in Bates,267 but because lawsuits themselves can 
raise public awareness of this important issue and influence 
both manufacturers and policymakers to provide greater 
protection to our nation’s children. 
 
 
                                                          
 267. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005). 
